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STUDENT COMMENTS
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN LABOR LAW .
INTRODUCTION
This article represents the third annual comment dealing with recent
developments in the field of national labor law.* The objective of this
comment is to explore and analyze in terms of their impact upon existing
doctrines, what the writers believe to be the most significant decisions of
the National Labor Relations Board and ithe United States courts. The
cases selected were those which were felt to most clearly represent significant
departures in policy application of the Labor Management Relations Act.
In emphasizing the doctrinal changes in the areas of principal concern under
the LMRA, the article has 'been segmented into four primary categories:
jurisdiction, enforcement of collective bargaining agreements under section
301, organizational and representational activities and unfair labor practices.
JURISDICTION .
1 PREEMPTION OF EMPLOYEE-UNION DISPUTES BY NLRA
The United States Supreme Court decided International Ass'n of
Machinists v. Gonzales' in 1957. The Court ruled that the NLRA did not
preempt state jurisdiction to order reinstatement of an illegally expelled
union member and to order consequential damages for loss of wages and
suffering due to his resultant loss of employment. The Court, relying upon
United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp.,2 held that whether the
action sounded in tort or contract, state jurisdiction is not displaced simply
because a coincidence of facts indicate that there may be a plausible pro-
ceeding before the NLRB, when the possibility of conflict with federal
policy is remote. Subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court have severely
limited application of the Gonzales "remote possibility" exception.
In the term following Gonzales, the Supreme Court decided San Diego
Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon . 3 Unlike Gonzales, Garmon involved a
suit by a nonunion employer against a union for damages resulting from
picketing proscribed by state law. The Court announced that when conduct
is "arguably" protected by section 7 or prohibited by section 8 of the Act,
due regard for federal policy requires that state jurisdiction yield. The
Court further stated that a different result is not required because the
• For an extensive discussion of the 1961 developments, see Comment, Labor
Law's New Frontier: The End of the Per Se Rules, 3 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 487
(1962); for an extensive discussion of the 1962 developments, see Comment, Recent
Developments in Labor Law, 4 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 661 (1963).
1 356 U.S. 617 ( 1958).
2 347 U.S. 656 (1954). The employer sued three labor organizations in tort for
damages. The Court held that although the "conduct" in question constituted an un-
fair labor practice, state jurisdiction was not precluded since Congress had not pre-
scribed procedure to remedy consequences of tortious conduct already committed.
The rationale of this case was overruled by Garmon, infra note 3.
8 359 U.S. 236 (1958).
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relief sought is damages, since the concern of the Court is in "delimiting
areas of conduct which must be free from state regulation if national policy
is to be left unhampered."' (Emphasis supplied.) The Court distinguished
Gonzales as involving conduct of "merely peripheral concern" to the na-
tional act.5
In June 1963, the Supreme Court handed down two decisions which
further defined the extent to which the federal act has preempted state
jurisdiction. Both Local 100, United Ass'n of Journeymen of Plumbers v.
Borden° and Local 207, lnt'l Ass'n of Bridge Workers v. Perko 7 dealt with
the principles laid down in Gonzales and Garmon. Both cases involved inter-
ference by a union with an expelled member's employment rights, conduct
arguably prohibited by the NLRA. The injured workers in both cases sued
the union in a state court for damages for tortious interference with their
right to contract and to pursue their lawful occupation. In addition, the
plaintiff in Borden alleged a breach of an implied promise not to discriminate
unfairly or to deny any member the right to work. In upholding the unions'
contentions that the national act preempted state jurisdiction, the Court
distinguished Gonzales as involving equitable relief directed at reinstatement
in the union of an illegally expelled member and not, as here, involving an
interference with the individual's employment opportunity. The Court
noted that unlike Gonzales, "no specific equitable relief was sought directed
to Borden's status in the union, and thus there was no state remedy to
`fill out' by permitting the award of consequential damages. The 'crux' of
the action (Gonzales .. .) concerned Borden's employment relations and
involved conduct arguably subject to the Board's jurisdiction." 8
It would appear from the decisions in Garmon, Perko and Borden,
that Gonzales must be limited strictly to its facts. State jurisdiction to pro-
vide relief is not foreclosed provided the "conduct" involved is solely of
an internal union nature. If the "conduct" involves interferences with the
aggrieved party's employment rights, exclusive jurisdiction must reside in
the National Labor Relations Board. This conclusion is warranted if one
considers that the national act is designed to regulate employer-union rela-
tions and not internal union affairs.
2. PREEMPTION OF PUBLIC UTILITY ANTI-STRIKE LAW BY NLRA
The Supreme Court recently had occasion to rule upon the validity
of the Missouri Public Utility Anti-Strike Law (King-Thompson Act) . 8
 The
Court in deciding Street Elec. Ry. and Motor Coach Employees v. Mis-
souri,'° held that the Missouri statute authorizing state seizure of privately
owned public utilities where the "public interest" so requires," and au-
4 Id. at 246.
0 Id. at 243.
373 U.S. 690 (1963).
7 373 U.S. 701 (1963).
8 Supra note 6, at 697.
9 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 295.10-.210 (1959).
10 374 U.S. 74 (1963); Note, 5 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 196 (1963).
11 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 295.180(1) (1959) authorizes the Governor, where a strike
. threatens to impair the operation of the utility so as to interfere with the public
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thorizing the issuance of injunctions against strikes after seizuren conflicts
with the federally guaranteed right to strike.' 3 Of critical importance was
the proclamation by the Governor that all rules and regulations governing
the internal management and organization of the company and its duties
and responsibilities were to remain in force and effect during the period of
state operation."
In declaring the measure unconstitutional, the Court relied upon its
1951 decision in Street Employees v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd."
despite several distinguishing points between the two cases. While the
statute involved in the Wisconsin Board case was a "comprehensive code"
for resolving labor disputes, the Missouri statute was of more limited ap-
plication, being invoked only in the case of a local emergency. However,
the Court in the Wisconsin Board case had made it clear that whether of
wide or limited application, the statute is invalid since "Congress has
closed to state regulation the field of peaceful strikes in industries affecting
interstate commerce." 1a
A second distinguishing feature of the Missouri case was the seizure
of the utility by the Governor of Missouri. If the seizure had the effect
of transforming the utility into a state instrumentality, the federal act
would not protect the workers' right to strike from infringement. This is
true because provisions of the federal act do not apply to state owned
instrumentalities. The Court dismissed the form of the conversion for sub-
stance and determined that such a mere paper transfer where the employees
did not become employees of the State, where the State did not pay their
wages or supervise their duties, where no property was transferred, and
where the State did not participate in the actual management of the company
"fell far short of creating a state-owned and operated utility." 17
This decision should close the door on state legislation curtailing the
right of peaceful strikes for legitimate labor objectives in the area of
privately owned public utilities."
interest, health and welfare . . . to take immediate possession of the plant, equipment
or facility for use and operation by the state of Missouri in the public interest."
12 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 295.200(6) (1959).
18 The Court relied upon Sections 7 and 13 of the NLRA as guaranteeing the
right to strike.
. Section 7 provides that "employees shall have the right to self-organization . . .
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing and to engage
in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection...."
Section 13 provides that except as otherwise provided in the Act, nothing "shall be
construed so as either to interfere . . . or to affect the limitations or qualifications on
that right."
14 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 295.190 (1959) provides that "the governor is authorized to
prescribe the necessary rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of this chapter."
15 340 U.S. 383 (1951). The Wisconsin statute made it a misdemeanor for public
utility employees to strike where to do so would cause an interruption of an essential
public utility service. Wis. Stat. ¢§ 111.50 et seq. (1949).
16 Id. at 394.
17 Supra note 10, at 81. •
18 At present, some fourteen states have statutory provisions dealing with strikes
and arbitration of disputes involving public utilities: Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Maine,
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3. AGENCY SHOP
The United States Supreme Court upheld" the Board's position 2° that
the "agency shop" was a permissible form of union security, not violative
of 8(a) (3) of the NLRA 2'
 The Board's view was that if Congress per-
mitted the union shop, it must have intended to permit union security
provisions which required only minimal adherence to unions. The Board
rejected the notion that the language of the statute should be read strictly
to permit only union security provisions which require membership in a
union. Payment of an amount equal to dues and initiation fees would not
be "membership" under this view.
The Supreme Court found that the 1947 amendments to the NLRA
altered the meaning of "membership" as it relates to union security
provisions:
Under the second proviso to 8(a) (3), the burdens of membership
upon which employment may be conditioned are expressly limited
to the payment of initiation fees and monthly dues. It is permissible
to condition employment upon membership, but membership,
insofar as it has significance to employment rights, may in turn
be conditioned only upon payment of fees and dues. "Membership"
as a condition of employment is whittled down to its financial
core.22 (Emphasis supplied.)
Therefore, the provision involved in General Motors was found to come
within the terms of 8(a) (3), and the employer violated 8(a) (5) in refusing
to bargain with the union over the agency shop proposal.
Even though an agency shop may be permissible under federal law,
the Supreme Court, in upholding the Florida Supreme Court in Retail Clerks
Intl Ass'n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 23 held that a state could declare
such provisions void under the state's right-to-work laws. Such action by
Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Dakota, Pennsylvania,
Texas, Virginia and Wisconsin.
13 NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963).
20 General Motors Corp., 133 N.L.R.B. 451, 48 L.R.R.M. 1659 (1961). This was
the decision on rehearing by the new Board which reversed the old Board. 130
N.L.R.B. 481, 47 L.R.R.M. 1306 (1961).
21 Section 8(a),(3) provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for. an
employer:
by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment . . . to encourage
or discourage membership in any labor organization: Provided, That nothing
in this Act, or in any other statute of the United States, shall preclude an em-
ployer from making an agreement with a labor organization . . . to require
as a condition of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth
day following the beginning of such employment or the effective date of
such agreement . . . : Provided further, That no employer shall justify any
discrimination against an employee for nonmembership in a labor organiza-
tion . . . (B) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that membership was
denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of an employee to
tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a con-
dition of acquiring or retaining membership. . . .
22 Supra note 19, at 742.
23 373 U.S. 746 (1963).
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the state is permitted by Section 14(b) of the NLRA, 24 the phrase "agree-
ments requiring membership in a labor organization," being given the same
meaning under 14(b) as determined under section 8(a)(3).23
In its holding, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that a
particular agency shop provision may be arguably an unfair labor practice
and that, therefore, the Board should have exclusive jurisdiction. The basis
of the Court's rejection was the Board's determination, as stated in its
General Motors brief, that the agency shop clause came within 8(a) (3)
and 14(b), and was therefore, subject to invalidation by the state. 26
In Schermerhorn II," the Court dealt with a second preemption issue:
whether a state court, rather than the NLRB alone, has jurisdiction to
enforce the state's prohibition of an agency shop agreement. It was held
that a state could enforce its own laws "restricting execution and enforce-
ment of union-security provisions. Since it is plain that Congress left the
States free to legislate in that field, we can only assume that it intended
to leave unaffected the power to enforce those laws." 28 The Court was clear,
however, in pointing out that the states' jurisdiction "begins only with actual
negotiation and execution of the type of agreement described by § 14(b)." 29
Left for further determination by the Supreme Court is the question
of whether the NLRB has any jurisdiction to enforce a state's prohibition
of union security provisions. This question is precipitated by the manner
in which the issue was framed in Schermerhorn II: "Whether the Florida
courts, rather than solely the National Labor Relations Board, are tribunals
with jurisdiction to enforce the State's prohibition. . . ." 3° (Emphasis sup-
plied.) The specific result of the Schermerhorn cases is to permit a state
to declare void union security agreements and to enforce its prohibition
of them. The enforcement power, however, is limited to the actual
negotiation and execution of the union-security agreement, while the Board
retains exclusive jurisdiction of union picketing to require an employer to
enter into such agreements or to hire only union men without regard to the
agreement then in existence between the union and employer. 3°°
24 Section 14(b) provides:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing the execution or ap-
plication of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such execution
or application is prohibited by State or Territorial law.
25 Supra note 23, at 751. The Court stated that: "At the very least, the agree-
ments requiring 'membership' in a labor union which arc expressly permitted by the
proviso [in (a)(3)] are the same 'membership' agreements expressly placed within
the reach of state law by 14(b)."
26 Id. at 756.
27 Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96 (1963).
28 Id. at 102.
29 Id. at 105.
80 Id, at 97. For a more complete discussion of the General Motors and Schermer-
horn cases and other questions raised, see Note, 5 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 440 (1964).
sea subsequent to submission of this article to the printer, the United States Supreme
Court decided Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 84 Sup. Ct. 894 (1964), a significant decision in-
volving the jurisdiction of a federal district court to set aside NLRB's fact-findings in
representation proceedings and to enjoin a pending election. The federal district court
had concluded, on the basis of Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958), that the Board's
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ENFORCEMENT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENTS UNDER SECTION 301
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Lincoln Mills,3 ' state and federal
courts have been applying federal law to suits instituted under section 301.
These courts have, in effect, been fashioning a body of procedural and
substantive law to govern section 301 actions.32
Many of the cases brought under section 301 have dealt with petitions
findings were insuf ficient as a matter of law to establish a joint employer status for
representation election purposes and that as such the Board violated the NLRA in
attempting to conduct an election where no employment relation existed. The Supreme
Court concluded, however, that Boire did not fall within the narrow limits of the Kyne
exception. The Supreme Court in Kyne had upheld a lower federal court order restraining
the Board's holding of an election upon the ground that the Board had conceded that
it had acted in excess of its statutory power. The Court there made it clear, however,
that the district court was "not one to 'review' in the sense of that term as used in the
Act, a decision of the Board made within its jurisdiction." 358 U.S. at 188. The Supreme
Court in Boire found that the determination of whether a joint employer status existed
was essentially a factual one. The Court concluded:
The Kyne exception is a narrow one, not to be extended to pertnit plenary
District Court review of Board orders in certification proceedings whenever it
can be said that an erroneous assessment of the particular facts before the Board
has led it to a conclusion which does not comport with the law. Judicial review
in such a situation has been limited by Congress to the Court of Appeals, and
then only under the conditions explicitly laid down in § 9(d) of the Act.
84 Sup. Ct. at 899.
81 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) in which the
Court held that courts must apply federal law in section 301 suits, the law to be
fashioned by the courts from the policy of the national labor laws.
82 Some of the more recent pronouncements by the Supreme Court include Smith
v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962) (Section 301 authorizes suit for breach
of a collective bargaining agreement and the court's jurisdiction is not preempted be-
cause the conduct involved also constitutes an unfair labor practice); Drake Bakeries,
Inc. v. Bakery Workers, Local 50, 370 U.S. 254 (1962) (An employer must arbitrate
claims for damages for breach of a no-strike clause where the language of the contract
is sufficiently broad to cover this); Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962)
(An employer can bring a damage action under section 301 for breach of a no-strike
clause without being required to arbitrate where the terms of the arbitration clause
limit arbitrable controversies to employee grievances); Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson,
370 U.S. 195 (1962) (The fact that an employer can sue under section 301 does not
repeal, either expressly or impliedly, the anti-injunctive provisions of the Norris-La
Guardia Act and thus does not make available injunctive relief for breach of a no-strike
clause); Teamsters, Local 174 v. Lucas Flower Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962) (A state court
must apply federal law to actions brought under section 301. A no-strike clause is im-
plied with respect to grievances, which under the contract, the employer is under a
duty to arbitrate); Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962) (State
courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts for suits brought for violation
of contract under section 301); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel &
Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960) (The question of interpretation of the collective bargain-
ing agreement is for the arbitrator and not the courts); United Steelworkers of Am.
v. Warrior and Gulf Nay. Co., 363 US. 574 (1960) (Apart from matters which the
parties specifically exclude, all questions on which the parties disagree must come within
the scope of the grievance and arbitration procedure of the collective bargaining agree-
ment); United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960) (Where
the parties have agreed to submit all questions of interpretation to arbitration, the
court's function is confined to determining whether the party seeking arbitration is
making a claim which on its face is governed by the contract.)
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for enforcement of arbitration provisions contained in collective bargaining
contracts. In dealing with such cases, the courts have been guided by the
principle that it is the federal policy to promote industrial peace and
stability and that voluntary arbitration serves to effectuate that policy."
The Supreme Court recently decided another section 301 case, Carey v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp." The petitioning union, IUE, and Westinghouse
were parties to a collective bargaining agreement under which the IUE was
the certified representative of "all production and maintenance em-
ployees, . . . but excluding all salaried technical . . . employees" who were
represented by Federation. IUE filed a grievance under the grievance pro-
cedure which provided for arbitration of unresolved disputes alleging that
certain production and maintenance work was being performed by workers
represented by Federation. Upon Westinghouse's refusal to arbitrate the
dispute on the ground that it involved a representation matter within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Board, the IUE petitioned the Supreme Court
of New York to compel arbitration. The Supreme Court refused to compel
arbitration and that court was affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals
on the ground that the dispute involved a definition of bargaining units
which was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board."
The Supreme Court of the United States recognized that this juris-
dictional dispute could be one of two types: a controversy over which union
should perform certain work; or a controversy over which union should
represent certain workers. The Court held that whether the case was a
work-assignment dispute or a representation dispute, in light of federal
policy favoring arbitration, the arbitration procedure outlined in this collec-
tive bargaining agreement should apply to resolve the dispute. Assuming the
controversy involved a work-assignment, the Court reasoned that the union
should not have to resort to a strike before it would have a means of resolving
the dispute 9 0 Such would not be consonant with federal labor policy which
seeks stability and favors private settlement of disputes to government
intervention. If on the other hand, it was a representation dispute, the
Court asserted that the fact that the Board may later be called upon to
decide the matter does not preclude application of the arbitration procedure
since in such event the Board will have the benefit of the arbiter's decision."
The Court concluded that:
If it is a work assignment dispute, arbitration conveniently
fills a gap and avoids the necessity of a strike to bring the matter
to the Board. If it is a representation matter, resort to arbitration
33 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior and Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960),
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
34 375 U.S. 261 (1964). For an extensive discussion of this case, see Note, infra
at 821.
35 230 N.Y.S.2d 703, 184 N.E.2d 298 (1962).
36 Section 8(b) (4) (d) and Section 10(k) of the NLRA would have to be invoked
before a remedy could be afforded by the Board.
37 Either the IUE or Westinghouse could have petitioned the Board for clarifi-
cation of the union's certificate if the union alleged that certain employees should be
in that union in light of the jobs which they perform.
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may have a pervasive, curative effect even though one union is not
a party.
By allowing the dispute to go to arbitration its fragmentation
is avoided to a substantial extent; and those conciliatory measures
which Congress deemed vital to "industrial peace" . . . and which
may be dispositive of the entire dispute, are encouraged. The su-
perior authority of the Board may be invoked at any time. Mean-
while the therapy of arbitration is brought to bear in a complicated
and troubled area."
Mr. Justice Black in dissent" could not see the wisdom in permitting
the dispute to go to arbitration when only one of the two unions is a
party to the proceeding thus precluding final disposition of the controversy.
The majority clearly recognized this possibility but regarded it as a lesser
evil than a strike to compel Board resolution." Mr. Justice Black also felt
that permitting suit against an employer by a union for refusal to bargain
when the employer is caught in the middle of a jurisdictional dispute is
unjust. If he guesses wrong as to which union's members will be awarded
the disputed jobs, he is open to a suit for damages. Mr. Justice Black
concluded:
. . . the Court's recently announced leanings to treat arbi-
tration as an almost sure and certain solvent of all labor troubles
has been carried so far in this case as unnecessarily to bring about
great confusion and to delay final and binding settlements to
jurisdictional disputes by the Labor Board, the agency which I
think Congress intended to do that very job:"
It is apparent that adoption of Mr. Justice Black's view would cut
deeply into the holding of the Supreme Court in Smith v. Evening News
Ass'n.42
Does a strike in violation of a no-strike clause automatically relieve
an employer of his responsibility to arbitrate that grievance under the
arbitration clause of the collective bargaining agreement? This question
was presented to the Supreme Court in United Packinghouse, Food and
Allied Workers, Local 721 v. Needham Packing Co." Mr. Justice Harlan,
writing for a unanimous court, found that the Court's decision in Drake
Bakeries, Inc. v. Bakery Workers, Local 50 44 was directly applicable. The
Court held that the mere existence of a no-strike clause does not ipso
facto imply that disputes involving or following an alleged breath of the
no-strike clause are excepted from the company's duty to arbitrate.
38 Supra note 34, at 272.
39 It is important to note that Mr. Justice Black regarded the dispute as one
involving work assignment only.
40 Supra note 34, at 265.
41 Id. at 276.
42 It is important to note that Mr. Justice Black was the lone dissenter in Smith v.
Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
43 84 Sup. Ct. 733 (1964).
44 370 U.S. 254 (1962).
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Whether a union waives its right to arbitrate by committing such a breach
would seem to depend upon specific language to that effect in the contract.
In Humphrey v. Moore,45 decided the same day as Carey, the Supreme
Court held that a union member can sue his union under section 301 for
breach of the duty of fair representation. The Court held that the fact
that such action may also give rise to an unfair labor practice charge"
would not, under the doctrine announce•in Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 47
preclude such a suit under section 301. The Court concluded, however,
that the facts were not sufficient to sustain the allegations.
Mr. Justice Goldberg concurred in the result, but disagreed that the
cause of action stems from a breach of the collective bargaining agreement.
It was his opinion that the union's duty of fair representation stems not
from the collective bargaining agreement but from the national act itself ; 49
and that the collective bargaining agreement should not be open to collateral
attack where there has been only a failure on the part of the union in its
duty to represent fairly and not willful participation by the employer in
the alleged breach. He concluded:
We should not, and, indeed, we need not strain, therefore, as
the Court does, to convert a breach of the union's duty to individual
employees into a breach of the collective bargaining agreement
between the employer and the union. 49 •
The majority and Mr. Justice Goldberg in his concurring opinion agreed
that the dovetailing of seniority by the union under these circumstances
did not constitute a breach of the union's duty of fair representation.
It would appear that an employee would have an easier time proving
a cause of action under the majority's view than under that set forth by
Mr. Justice Goldberg. To prove a cause of action for breach of the duty
of fair representation under the Goldberg approach, it must be shown that
there was both a breach of such duty and invidious classification. To set
forth a cause of action under section 301, on the other hand, the latter
element does not have to be proven.
REPRESENTATIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES
I. APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT
The facility of organizing employees in large businesses has been
given continued impetus by the present Board, especially in the retail chain
45 375 U.S. 335 (1964). For an extensive discussion of this case, see Note, infra
at 848.
46 The question of whether the breach of duty of fair representation constitutes
an unfair labor practice is widely debated. Cf. NLRB v. Local 294, Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters, 317 F.2d 746 (2d Cir. 1963),' with Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181,
51 L.R.R.M. 1584 (1962) cited for comparison by the Court. See generally Cox, The
Duty of Fair Representation, 2 Vill. L. Rev. 151 (1957).
47 Supra note 42.
48 Mr. Justice Goldberg views the case as within the principles announced in
Syres v. Oil Workers Int'l Union, 350 U.S. 892 (1955) and Steele v. Louisville & N.R.,
323 U.S. 192 (1944).
49 Supra note 45, at 357.
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and insurance agent field. In both areas the tendency of the old Board
(Eisenhower Board) was to recognize only larger units—industry, state or
nation-wide—as appropriate, placing emphasis on the integrated nature
of the employer's business operations and the difficulties inherent in the
employer's dealing with fragmented units.
In reversing this policy, the new Board (Kennedy Board) has con-
sidered the organizational difficulties in unionizing large, dispersed opera-
tions. In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.," the union petitioned for a bargaining
unit of insurance agents of all the district offices of Metropolitan Life
located within the city limits of Chicago. Several of these offices had
territories extending beyond the city limits, while three suburban offices
had territories extending into the city. In a prior case the Board had
found" that an individual district office could be an appropriate unit for
collective bargaining and that this did not "preclude the grouping of such
offices where such grouping is justified by cogent geographic consid-
erations."52 The Board found that this previous case governed the situation
and determined that the unit was appropriate. The fact that the territories
may have extended beyond the city limits was not considered crucial because
the territories of the various district offices were subject to frequent change.
The new Board's policy has been generally approved by the courts of
appeal. In NLRB v. Quaker City Life Ins. Co., 53
 the court granted enforce-
ment of the Board's order requiring the company to cease and desist from
refusing to recognize and bargain with the unit of insurance agents
certified by the Board as appropriate. The union in 1953, had failed to or-
ganize employees on a state-wide basis, and in 1961 the Board approved a
unit limited to one city. The court of appeals held that the Board did
not abuse its discretion in approving the smaller unit since the job specifica-
tions were highly standardized, working conditions were similar and each
office was a separate entity."
The principal point raised by the old Board members in their dissents
in these cases is that the decisions of the majority have been based on the
extent of organization by the union, contrary to the mandate of Congress. 55
Just what "extent of organization" means has never been clearly explained.
In Texas Pipe Line Co. v. NLRB, 56 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit rejected the contention that the Board must disregard the extent
sO 144 N.L.R.B. No. 15, 54 L.R.R.M. 1005 (1963).
51 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 138 NL.R.B. 512, 51 L.R.R.M. 1077 (1962).
62 Id. at 515, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1078. The grouping found appropriate there was
a geographic area in the city of Cleveland. Since it is found separate and distinct,
"and as there is no recent history of collective bargaining and no union seeks a broader
unit, we find that such a unit may be appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining."
Ibid.
53 319 F.2d 690 (4th Cir. 1963). This decision upheld the Board's original determi-
nation to depart from its 1944 holding in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 1635,
14 L.R.R.M. 187 (1944).
64 Id. at 693.
55 Section 9(c)(5) provides: "In determining whether a unit is appropriate for the
purposes specified in subsection (b) the extent to which the employees have organized
shall not be controlling."
60 296 F.2d 208 (5th Cir. 1961).
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of union organization in all cases of representation. Although conceding that
the language of the statute was ambiguous, the court held that this was
"one instance when a literal construction agrees with sound policy. Giving
the statutory language a literal reading, one would have to say that the
extent of organization, although not 'controlling,' is not ruled out as a
factor to be given weight." 67 Thus, the court held that although a factor
is not controlling, it may be entitled to weight. "By definition such a factor,
in a close case, may be determinative; otherwise the factor is deprived of
all significance."'"
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Quaker City went along
with the Fifth Circuit in finding that "extent of organization" may be con-
sidered by the Board as a factor. Originally, the Board felt that in view of the
nature of the insurance industry, insurance agents would be organized on a
state-wide level, and that therefore, it would not certify as appropriate, any
smaller unit. However, since the unions did not organize on the basis of the
larger unit, the Board found that such a policy was not feasible and that
the policy prejudiced the collective bargaining rights of employees. There-
fore, the Board proposed to apply "normal unit principles" in the insurance
field. In this regard, the court stated that: "the only effect given to the ex-
tent of organization was in the policy decision to overrule the Metropolitan
case and permit appropriate smaller than state-wide units." 89 Thus, the
Board's certification of the smaller unit took into consideration the factor of
the extent of organization, but, using normal unit principles, other factors
were controlling.
The First Circuit, in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 6° held with
the dissenting Board members, that the Board had certified a bargaining unit,
on the basis of the extent of union organization. In the case before them, the
57 Id. at 213. Cf. NLRB v. Glen Raven Knitting Mills, 235 F.2d 413 (4th Cir.
1956), where the court found that there was no doubt, based upon the record as a whole,
that the Board's decision was controlled by the extent of organization. The facts
showed that the union sought to organize the whole plant, but failing to win a consent
election, subsequently sought to organize a smaller unit—the production workers—and
again lost. The union finally was able to secure a majority of the knitters and the Board
certified them as an appropriate unit, on the grounds that the knitters were "the
most highly skilled and most thoroughly trained of all the workers in the plant and
that they operate, under their own supervisors more complicated and costly machines
than the other employees and, therefore, they constitute an appropriate unit." The
court found, however, that the interests of the knitters were not separate and distinct
from the other workers since they were all entitled to the same benefits, were subjected
to the same policies of management, and were all under a single plant superintendent.
58 Ibid.
59 Supra note 53, at 693. The dissenting members stated:
It is quite clear that the reason for the Board's decision to change the policy
. is that it is easier to organize small local district offices one at a time . 
than it is to organize the state-wide or company-wide group as a single unit.
This appears to me to be nothing less than a return to the heretofore un-
acceptable and outlawed practice of establishing provisional units which were
admittedly based on the extent of organization and a circumvention of the
express prohibition of the statute under the guise of a policy change.
Id. at 696.
60 55 L.R.R.M. 2444 (1st Cir. 1964). This was the first of many cases involving
Metropolitan Life that has reached a court of appeals.
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court found that the Board had certified as an approprite unit, only the dis-
trict office in Woonsocket, Rhode Island, although the company had eight
district offices and two detached offices in the state. The court determined,
not so much on the basis of the facts in the case, but on the basis of other
cases involving certification of insurance agents' bargaining units that the
extent of organization had been controlling. These cases involved a variety of
diverse units" which led the court to believe that the Board would grant
any unit which the union sought. In this regard, the court stated: "the Board
majority's actions . . . speak more clearly than its words. . . . In the ab-
sence . . . of any other rational basis for its varying unit determinations, we
can only conclude . . . that the majority has indeed reverted to its pre-1944
policy of regarding the extent of union organization as controlling in viola-
tion of § 9(c) (5) of the Act.""
The day following the First Circuit's opinion, the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit rendered its decision in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
NLRB," enforcing the Board's order. This court agreed with the Quaker
City court in upholding the Board's view that a change of policy in the in-
surance field was necessary to elminate the unfair prejudice to the collective
bargaining rights of employees which existed under the prior rule. The court
pointed out: "There is a vast difference between taking away an obstacle to
wider union organization and collective bargaining which is the explicit
legislative purpose and mandate of the Act, and determining appropriate
units on the basis of employee organization." 69
The Third Circuit appeared to have met the objections of the First
Circuit as to the diverse units approved by the Board. The court determined
that several different kinds of appropriate units could be found for a given
group of employees. In addition; the Board considers, as with other in-
dustries and retail establishments, many different factors in determining the
appropriate unit. This being so, the Board need only consider the factors
which would indicate whether the proposed unit was appropriate. As a
result, the court found that:
In The court seemed disturbed by the fact that the Board had certified a unit
consisting of six offices in the city of Cleveland and three suburban offices; a unit
consisting of all offices in the city of Chicago, excluding suburban offices whose
territories extended into the city; a unit consisting of two offices within a three district
office area in Delaware; a unit consisting of a single office in Sioux City, Iowa and
two offices under its administrative control, over 120 miles away.
62 Supra note 60, at 2447. The First Circuit felt handicapped by the Board's
failure to discuss the weight given to the extent of organization in its determination.
In addition, the court did not feel that the Board's determination that each district
office in Rhode Island was a separate administrative entity, that there was no recent
bargaining history, that the Woonsocket office was located in a separate and distinct
geographical area and that no union sought a larger unit, was sufficient independent •
evidence to substantiate the unit found appropriate by the Board. These are indications
that the court believed that these findings were a facade for the Board's actual deter-
mination: "Why should there be a community of interest among Metropolitan's agents
working from both city and suburban offices in Cleveland but no community of interest
among its agents working in both city and suburban offices in Chicago. . . ." Ibid.
63 55 L.R.R./VI. 2448 (3d Cir. 1964).
64 Id. at 2454.
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The criteria or factors considered for a single district office unit and
for a unit comprising several district offices will differ in the same
way as they differ somewhat in single plant and multi-plant de-
terminations. Thus while a single district office may be an appro-
priate unit, a grouping of two may not be in the same general area
where there are three district offices.°5
Approval was then given by the court to the various factors used by the
Board: whether the proposed unit is homogenous, identifiable and distinct;
previous bargaining history; community of interest among the employees;
geographical proximity; similarity of jobs and functions, and the relationship
between the proposed unit and the structure of the employer's business.
Along with these criteria, the Board may consider the extent of organiza-
tion as evidence in determining the appropriate unit."
The Board's policy of considering smaller units appropriate for collec-
tive bargaining was extended to retail store operations in F. W. Woolworth
Co." The Board granted the union's petition for a unit to include employees
who worked primarily at lunch and bakery counters, the snack bar and in the
kitchen. The Board found that all the store employees were hired under the
same procedure, were on a store-wide payroll and received the same starting
hourly wage, vacation, sick leave, holiday, pension, Christmas bonus and
discount benefits. However, the following factors were considered sufficient to
permit the establishment of the smaller bargaining unit: there was little
interchange among the unit sought and the rest of the employees; this was
the only department under separate supervision; there was a "mutuality of
interest" among the desired unit—in the type of work performed, their train-
ing skills—and no other labor organization was seeking a broader unit.
The Fourth Circuit expanded these principles in General Instrument
Corp. v. NLRB." The emloyees involved there were classified into two
groups: engineers and laboratory workers. The two groups continually
worked together but there were significant areas where there was no common
interest: engineers were professional people, were college graduates and were
working on a salary basis without overtime pay, while the laboratory workers
were not college trained, were non-professional employees and were paid
on an hourly basis with overtime pay. The union sought to represent only
the laboratory workers but the Regional Director included both groups in
the appropriate unit. In reversing and directing an election among the lab-
oratory workers only, the Board's decision was in part based on the fact
that the union sought to represent only the laboratory workers and that
65 Ibid.
66 In considering the extent of organization, however, the court stated that:
The extent to which the Union failed to organize should not determine the
appropriateness of the group it did organize. To hold, that because the Union
failed to organize on a broader basis, the smaller unit petitioned for is
inappropriate, would be to penalize the Union for failing in an attempt to
organize, which right is fundamental to the Act. (Emphasis supplied.)
Id. at 2452.
67 144 N.L.R.B. No. 35, 54 L.R.R.M. 1043 (1963).
" 319 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 966 (1964).
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there was no showing of interest among the professional employees to join
the union. The court of appeals, in affirming the Board's position, indicated
that if the sole basis of the Board's decision was the union's unwillingness
to represent the professional employees and the showing of a lack of interest
among them in joining a union, the situation may have been controlled by
the Glen Raven case," on the ground that the Board gave controlling effect
to the extent of union organization. The court stated, however, that:
When a union files a petition limited to a certain group, presumably
either the union lacks interest in those excluded, or the extent of
organization has not extended far enough to include them. Since
these may be factors (although not controlling), and since profes-
sional employees generally have interests separate from other em-
ployees, it is reasonable for the Board to require a showing of
interest among professionals when it is contended that they be in-
cluded in the unit."
The trend has been continued by recent Board decisions, and has re-
ceived impetus from at least two courts of appeal, favoring union petitions
for smaller bargaining units. This trend has been away from emphasizing the
• integrated operations of the employer, and toward giving a more presump-
tive effect to the literal language of Section 9(b) 71 of the NLRA. 72 On this
basis the Board has reversed its policy decisions in regard to insurance agents
and retail stores, reverting to the application of the unit principles used in
other multi-plant or multi-office enterprises. 73 This policy does away with
09 Supra note 57.
70 Supra note 68, at 423.
71 Section 9(b) provides: "The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order
to assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this
subchapter, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the
employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof: . . ."
72 In Dixie Belle Mills, Inc,, 139 N.L.R.B. 629, 51 L.R.R.M' 1344 (1962),' the
Board stated:
A single-plant unit, being one of the unit types listed in the statute as appro-
priate for bargaining purposes, is presumptively appropriate. Therefore, unless
such plant unit has been so effectively merged into a more comprehensive
unit by bargaining history, or is so integrated with another as to negate its
identity, it is an appropriate unit even though another unit, if requested, might
also be appropriate.
Id. at 631, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1345.
73 In regard to retail chain operations, the Board indicated its shifting position
in Say-On Drugs, Inc., 138 NL.R.B. 1032, 51 L.R.R.M. 1152 (1962), where it was
stated:
. we believe that too frequently it [prior policy] has operated to impede the
exercise by employees in retail chain operations of their rights to self-organiza-
tion guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. In our opinion that policy has over
emphasized the administrative grouping of merchandising outlets at the expense
of factors such as geographic separation of the several outlets and the local
managerial autonomy of the separate outlets; and it has ignored completely as
a factor the extent to which the claiming labor organization had sought to
organize the employees of the retail chain. We have decided to modify this'
policy and to apply to retail chain operations the same unit policy which we ap-
ply to multiplant enterprises in general.
Id. at 1033, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1153.
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exceptions to the general rules and regulations, thereby facilitating organiza-
tional activities of unions and assuring employees "the fullest freedom in
exercising the rights guaranteed by this Act. . . ."
2. CONTRACT BAR
In Gary Steel Supply Co. 74 the Board has finally done away with the
Keystone75
 decision as it effects the contract bar rule in relation to union-
security clauses and check-off provisions. 7° In Gary Steel, several months
after a collective bargaining agreement was entered into by the Company and
the Teamsters Union, it was discovered that there was an error as to the
anniversary date of the agreement. The agreement was redrafted to conforin
to the previous understanding of the parties. The petitioning union con-
tended that both agreements contained an illegal check-off provision by
failing to conform to the language of Section 302(c) (4) 77 of the LMRA and
that the later agreement resulted in an illegal retroactive union-security
clause. The Board held that the corrected agreement did not result in a
new agreement to be applied retroactively, but was merely a reformation.
The contention as to the check-off clause also was found to be without merit
in that such a provision need not expressly use, or conform to the language
of the statute.
In so holding, the Board found, as it had in Paragon Prods. Corp.,"
that the policy of the Act will best be effectuated by finding the agreement
a bar to an election petition where the provision may be ambiguous but not
unlawful since: "A contract will not be considered defective as a bar .. .
simply because it contains a checkoff provision which fails to spell out the
requirements of the proviso . . . , unless the checkoff provision is either
unlawful on its face or has otherwise been determined to be illegal in an
unfair labor practice proceeding. . . .'' 7°
Thus, the presumption is in favor of check-off provisions which are not
unlawful on their face, requiring a showing of an in fact violation of the
statute by the challenging union or employer. It would seem that it is merely
necessary to make provision in the agreement for check-off, leaving the terms
of the provision to be provided by the statute.
74 144 N.L.R.B. No. 45, 54 L.R.R.M. 1082 (1963).
78 Keystone Coat, Apron & Towel Supply Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 880, 42 L.R.R.M.
1456 (1958).
76 The Board still adheres to its position that a "hot-cargo" provision in an
agreement will not bar an election. See Comment, 4 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 661, 665
(1963).
77 Section 302(c)(4) exempts from proscription the receipt of moneys from
the employer to the union "(4) with respect to money deducted from the wages of
employees in payment of membership dues . . . : Provided, That the employer has
received from each employee, on whose account such deductions are made, a written
assignment which shall not be irrevocable for a period of more than one year, or beyond
the termination date of the applicable collective agreement, whichever occurs sooner.. . .".
78 134 N.L.R.B. 662, 49 L.R.R.M. 1160 (1961).
714 Supra note 74, at 1083.
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3. NO-SOLICITATION AND NO-DISTRIBUTION RULES
The Board recently obtained is first reviews° of its rules pertaining to
no-solicitation and no-distribution laid down in Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co 8 1
In Stoddard-Quirk the Board added an "area" test to its previous "working
time" test. The basis for the addition was the different legal effects result-
ing from the distinction between oral solicitation and the distribution of
literature."
From a review of the precedents of past Board policy and Supreme Court
decisions," the Board established the following rules: (1) a rule prohibiting
oral solicitation by employees during their nonworking time will be pre-
sumptively invalid, regardless of where the solicitation takes place; (2) a
rule prohibiting oral solicitation during working time, regardless of the
place of solicitation, will be presumptively valid; (3) a no-distribution rule
prohibiting employees from distributing literature in working areas, regard-
less of whether it applies to working or nonworking 'time, will be presump-
tively valid; and (4) a_no-distribution rule applying to nonworking areas
and nonworking time, will be presumptively invalid.
The Board in Stoddard-Quirk split, Chairman McCulloch joining the
old Board members, Leedom and Rodgers, while the new Board members,
Fanning and Brown, dissented only as to the rules which would give pre-
80 NLRB v. United Aircraft Corp., 324 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 32
U.S.L. Week 3326 (U.S. March 24, 1964) (No. 807).
81 138 N.L.R.B. 615, 51 L.R.R.M. 1110 (1962).
82 Part of the Board's explanation is as follows:
The distinction is not fortuitous. It springs from the fact that solicitation and
distribution of literature are different organizational techniques and their imple-
mentation poses different problems both for the employer and for the em-
ployees. . . . Thus, it has been noted that solicitation, being oral in nature,
impinges upon the employer's interests only to the extent that it occurs on
working time, whereas distribution of literature, because it carries the potential
of littering the employer's premises, raises a hazard to production whether
it occurs on working time or nonworking time.
Id. at 619, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1112-13.
To sum up, we believe that to effectuate organizational rights through the
medium of oral solicitation, the right of employees to solicit on plant premises
must be afforded subject only to the restriction that it be on nonworking time.
However, because distribution of literature is a different technique and poses
different problems both from the point of view of the employees and from
the point of view of management, we believe organizational rights in that re-
gard require only that employees have access to nonworking areas of the
plant premises.
Id. at 621, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1113-14.
83 Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945), which upheld the
Board's decisions in Republic Aviation Corp., 51 N.L.R.B. 1186, 12 L.R.R.M. 320
(1943), and LeTourneau Co., 54 N.L.R.B. 1253, 13 L.R.R.M. 227 (1944); NLRB v.
Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956), which reversed the Board, 109 N.L.R.B.
485, 34 L.R.R.M. 1373 (1954), Ranco, Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 998, 34 L.R.R.M. 1486
(1954), and Seamprufe, Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 24, 34 L.R.R.M. 1293 (1954); NLRB v.
. United Steelworkers (Nutone, Inc.), 357 U.S. 357 (1958), which upheld the Board, 112
N.L.R.B. 1153, 36 L.R.R.M. 1165 (1955), and reversed the Board in Avondale Mills,
115 N.L.R.B. 840, 37 L.R.R.M. 1423 (1956).
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sumptive validity to the prohibition against employees distributing literature
in working areas of the plant while on their own time.
Within a month after promulgation of these rules, the Board decided the
United Aircraft Corp. case." In this case the Board was only faced with
those rules which both the majority and the dissenters agreed upon in
Stoddard-Quirk. The employer had instituted a rule prohibiting employees
from distributing union literature on company property, including in non-
working areas, on the employees own time. The company tried to justify the
rule on the grounds that there was littering of its property, that there were
cafeteria disturbances and that there was abusive language used by distribu-
tors. The Board held that the rule violated section 8(a) (1), citing Stoddard-
Quirk.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the Board," not
only as to its no-distribution rules but also as to the Board's determination
that it was not required to consider evidence of alternative methods by
which the union could have reasonably communicated with the employees.
As to the former, the court had no problem in sustaining the Board's pre-
sumption, as long as it was "... rationally justifiable; there must be a logical
nexus between what is proved and what is presumed."" The major issue,
therefore, was whether it was necessary to consider alternative methods of
communication to give rationality to the presumption.
The Board had originally affirmed the ruling of the Trial Examiner, who
stated:
With respect to other avenues of communication, the Supreme Court
and the Board have made it unequivocably clear that their avail-
ability to the Union has no relevance where an employee's right to
distribute union literature is involved as distinguished from a
nonemployee's right which depends on the lack of other effective
means of reaching employees. For this reason, I find it unnecessary
to determine whether the Union had other reasonable alternatives
for communicating with employees.87 (Emphasis in original.)
The court agreed, stating that employees cannot be prohibited from "solici-
ting" on their own time unless the employer can show special circumstances
which would make the rule necessary to maintain discipline or production."
The court, however, due to the way it phrased the issue in the case, reached
the same result as did the Board, but by a different route. The coures . con-
elusion was based on an independent investigation, which indicated that the
Board's presumption was "rationally justifiable." The court did not use the'
Board's approach of relying on past precedent. Their conclusion was based
on the ground that the existence of alternative methods was remote, but even
84 139 N.L.R.B, 39, 51 L,R.R.M. 1259 (1962).
85 Supra note 80.
' 86 Id. at 130.
87 Supra note 84, at 45-46.
88 The court seems to use the word "solicitation" in such a way as to include
"distribution." This appears to obliterate the attempt of the Board in Stoddard-Quirk
to point out that there was a distinction between the two terms and the resulting legal
effects.
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apart from the remoteness, "clearly the existence of available alternatives
would not mitigate this deleterious effect [management limitation on use of
worker's own time] or insure the employee the organizational freedom which
the Act seeks to give him." 99
The result of the United Aircraft case is to cause a split in the circuits.
In 1959, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in NLRB v. Rockwell
Mfg. Co.,90
 held that it was error for the Board not to consider available
alternatives for the union to communicate with employees, even when the
distribution was done by the employees and not outsiders. In Rockwell, the
employer had a no-distribution rule in effect for about six years prior to
the unfair labor practice charge which was precipitated by the employer's
denial of permission to his employees to distribute union literature in
the company parking lot.
The court read the trilogy of Supreme Court cases as requiring the
company to justify its presumptively invalid no-distribution rule. But since
the burden of proving an unfair labor practice is on the Board, the Board
must also, it concluded, consider evidence as to alternative means open to
the union. Only in this way could an adjustment be made between the em-
ployee's right to organize and the employer's right to maintain production
and discipline." The result of the court's insistence upon the Board's con-
sideration of all the evidence is that:
. .. if the employees have virtually no alternative opportunities
to distribute literature . . . then the respondent must show strong
justification for its prohibition. Conversely, when ... the employees
have readily available alternative means of distribution, the em-
ployer's duty to show exceptional justifying circumstances is les-
sened."
The Third Circuit impliedly found this additional burden placed on the
Board in prior Supreme Court decisions, whereas the Second Circuit indi-
cated that its decision was based more on the rationality of the Board's pre-
sumption and the policy of the Act. It would appear that this area of or-
ganizational activity is ripe for Supreme Court clarification, especially in
view of the fact that this area presents the major source of work for the
Board.
The rules adopted in Stoddard-Quirk make specific reference to solicita-
tion and distribution by employees. When non-employee solicitation is in-
volved, the Supreme Court" has required the Board to distinguish between
89 Supra note 80, at 131.
99 271 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1959).
91 The court stated:
... the Board was bound to consider not only the evidence that was offered
as to the impact that the distribution of literature would have on plant
discipline, cleanliness, order, etc., but also the effect that the bar against dis-
tribution would have on the ability of the employees to organize. . . .
The court added: "The Board also should have considered the fact that if employees
were permitted to distribute literature, non-employees could no longer be barred under
the holding of Babcock & Wilcox. . . ." (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 115,
92 Ibid.
93 NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox, supra note 83.
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the obligation owed by the employer to employees and that owed to non-
employees. In its previous interpretation of Supreme Court cases, the Board
had held that no-solicitation and no-distribution rules which prohibit activity
by non-employees at any time on company property were presumptively
valid, absent evidence that the union could not reasonably reach the em-
loyees with their message by other means, or evidence that the company
discriminates against the union by permitting other solicitation or distribu-
tion."
The Board was faced with non-employee organizers in May Dept.
Stores,95 where the company had in force a no-solicitation rule which pro-
hibited employees from soliciting on company time in working areas and
which prohibited solicitation by non-employees anywhere on company prop-
erty. The rule was held presumptively valid, but the employer was found
to have violated 8(a) (1) in application of his no-solicitation rule by denying
a union request for "equal time" on company property following an anti-
union speech by the employer. Since the most effective place for reaching all
the employees was the employer's premises, the employer's foreclosure of
this forum to the union and his use of the premises irretrievably diminished
the effectiveness of the union's appeal to the employees. Since the employer
had the most advantageous forum, it automatically relegated other avenues
of communication to "catch-as-catch-can" methods. In so holding, the Board
attempted to resurrect Bonwit Teller?' by holding that a denial of equal time,
where retail store operations are involved, was a violation of 8(a) (1).
The court of appeals recently reversed 97 the Board, basing its decision
on the absence of any showing of the existence of alternative means of com-
munication, and their effectiveness, in view of the employer's conduct, in
getting the union's message to the employees. The failure to show a true
diminution in the ability of the union to communicate with employees was
error by the Board. It was held that whether there was an imbalance in op-
portunities is dependent upon the existence of alternatives, and the fore-
closing of one of these means does not automatically diminish the other
alternatives to the point of ineffectiveness.
Thus, whereas the Board in Stoddard-Quirk specified certain rules in
regard to employees, the Board has not clarified no-solicitation and no-distri-
bution rules as related to non-employees, other than its statement in the
Walton case." The Board did however, recognize an exception to the general
rule in the case of retail store operations concerning the presumption against
validity of a no-solicitation or no-distribution rule as it prohibits solicita-
tion by employees on their own time. In this instance, the company could
promulgate its rule without a specific showing of "special circumstances."
But no exception need be made where the rules preclude non-employees from
gaining access to company property. This refers to the validity of establishing
the rules, not as to the enforcement of them. The Board seems to require less
97 Walton Mfg. Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 697, 698, 45 L.R.R.M. 1370, 1371 (1960).
95 136 N.L.R.B. 797, 49 L.R.R.M. 1862 (1962).
96 96 N.L.R.B. 608, 28 L.R.R.M. 1547 (1951).
97 May Dep't Stores Co. v. NLRB, 316 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1963).
98 Supra note 94.
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showing of ineffectiveness of alternative methods where a valid rule is ap-
plied, than where the validity of the rule itself is in question. The Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit indicates that when dealing with retail stores,
and non-employees, as distinguished from employees, the burden of showing
an imbalance is not diminished.
4 EMPLOYER INTERFERENCE WITH ELECTIONS
A. Interrogation by Employer's Counsel
The Board's attempt to hold counsel individually liable on an 8(a) (1)
charge was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in NLRB
v. Guild Industries Mfg. Corp." The facts here indicated that counsel, Saad,
interrogated twelve employees to obtain proof to challenge a pending repre-
sentation election. In addition, Saad had asked questions of the employees
in relation to a pending unfair labor practice charge against Guild, most of
the witnesses being sworn and testifying before a court reporter.
The court found that the Board's order relating to Saad was unprece-
dented, but did not feel precluded from holding him liable separately as a
respondent. For the Board to do so, however, ". . . it must appear that the
lawyer was purposely aiding the employer in contravening the statute, rather
than restricting his activity to matters within the scope of and relevant to
rights of the employer by way of proceedings pending or imminent. "100
There was no substantial evidence to show that Saad had gone beyond
proper bounds where the questioning was relevant to the pending election
and unfair labor practice proceedings. In addition, the court was constrained
to point out the need to balance the right of the employer and employees,
and that to charge counsel and put him on trial along with the employer "is
tantamount to a restraint, intimidatory and coercive in nature."'°'
The balance between employer and employees rights shifted with the
use of a court reporter to take sworn testimony. It was decided in NLRB v.
Lindsay Newspapers, Inc., 102
 a case of first impression, that the use of a
court reporter to take sworn testimony was unlawful under 8(a) (1) as
being coercive since the situation could create a strong impression in the
minds of laymen that there would be legal sanctions which in fact do not
exist.'" The Guild court upheld its decision in the Lindsay case, but re-
fused to apply it to Saad because the Lindsay case was not decided until
after the interrogation involved here.
B. Pre-Election Conduct of Employer
The majority of the NLRB has attempted to make clear the distinction
between the rules applicable to statements of the employer in pre-election
campaigns, which may be classified as misrepresentations, from those which
constitute improper threats and promises of benefit. In Oak Mfg. Co. ,104
99 321 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1963).
100 Id. at 112.
101 Ibid.
102 315 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1963).
103 Id. at 711.
104 141 N.L.R.B. No. 121, 52 L.R.R.M. 1502 (1963).
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the Board indicated that where there were misrepresentations, the factors
of the timing of the employers' letters, their truthfulness and the opportunity
of the union to dissipate the effects of these misrepresentations are crucial.
But where threats or promises of benefit are made by the employer, rebuttal
statements of the union are irrelevant. In the latter situation, which was
here involved, the letters, taken as a whole, clearly demonstrated the em-
ployer's intent to coerce the employees to vote against the union: 1 °5
The entire tone of the two letters is one of emphasizing the Em-
ployer's control of their economic status, and the futility and eco-
nomic hazards of selecting the Union. . . . For while purporting
to discuss possibilities, it was the Employer alone who could trans-
late these possibilities into realities. In this context, we find the
Employer's statements to be a threat to the economic welfare of the
employees.'"
The Board's view was emphasized in Lord Baltimore Pressl" and Carl
T. Mason Co 108 In the former case, the letters set out the possibilities that
might result from the employees' choice of the union. 10° The Board, looking
to the entire context of the letters, set aside the subsequent election stating:
"To read the letter herein as a whole, as we must, is to realize that its en-
tire thrust, achieved by the careful juxtaposition of foreboding possibilities,
is to impress upon the employees the futility of choosing the Petitioner." 1"
Whether the employer's legal position has merit or whether the coercive effects
could be dissipated by the union is immaterial and does not protect the
employer's threatening conduct.
In Carl T. Mason, in addition to the pre-election letter expressing the
hope that any "ill-considered" action of the employees will not force the
employer out of business, the employer showed "And Women Must Weep,"
a film previously condemned as coercive. Again, the Board stated that the
employer's conduct must be viewed in its total context. The Board here
found that the employer's threatening intent was made all the more clear by
the exhibition of the film.
These cases indicate that the Board's experience in election cases
necessitates careful scrutiny of the employer's pre-election statements in
order to insure the maintenance of the proper laboratory conditions. Where
105 In the first of two letters the employer stated that the union "'cannot and
will not obtain any wage increase for you.'" He stated that his fringe benefits were
better than most in the area and that they would be improved whether or not the
union got in, and that the union's seniority program "'will be worse.'" In the second
letter the employer stated that the union could not improve wages or other benefits
and that "'You have everything to gain and nothing to lose by voting No.' " Id. at
1502.
106 Id. at 1503.
107 142 N.L,R.B. No. 40, 53 L.R.R.M. 1019 (1963)..
lee
	
N.L.R.B. No. 56, 53 L.R.R.M. 1063 (1963).
100 The employer indicated that he might be forced out of business with the re-
sultant loss of jobs; that the union's demands would be so unreasonable that he
would have to resist, which would result in a strike; that the unit certified would not
be appropriate and therefore he would refuse to bargain with it. Supra note 95, at 1020.
110 Ibid.
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these conditions ".. . have been jeopardized by material misrepresentations,
threats, or promises of benefit, either express or implied, the Board has not
hesitated to set elections aside.
An employer has been found to have interfered with an election, com-
mitting an unfair labor practice under 8(a) (1), by conferring unconditional
benefits on his employees two weeks before an election. In NLRB v. Ex-
change Parts, 112
 the employer, after announcing new benefits, sent a letter
to his employees stating that it was the Company that "puts things in
your envelope," that only the Company could do that and that it "didn't
take a Union to get any of those things and . . . it won't take a Union
to get additional improvements in the future."'" The Board found this
conduct to have unlawfully affected the outcome of the election and that
the employer so intended that result. In reversing the court of appeals,
the Supreme Court agreed, stating that: "The danger inherent in well-
timed increases in benefits is the suggestion of a fist inside the velvet
glove."'" The Court found that the fact that such benefits are uncondi-
tional and permanent does not give the employer the absolute right to
confer benefits, and will not be a defense to an 8(a) (1) violation. While
the inference of coercion by promise of benefits is diminished by making the
grant unconditional and permanent, "... the absence of conditions or threats
pertaining to particular benefits conferred would be of controlling significance
only. if it could be presumed that no question of additional benefits or re-
negotiation of existing benefits would arise in the future; and, of course, no
such presumption is tenable."'"
The result of the Exchange Parts decision appears to be that the un-
conditional and permanent grant of a benefit is not per se unlawful, but it
is incumbent upon the employer to refrain from "calculated good will"
when conferring benefits during the pre-election period. Nevertheless, while
the absence of conditions or threats will not be of controlling effect where
there are grants of unconditional and permanent benefits, they will be a
factor to be considered, and other unlawful conduct can be sought to find
an unfair labor practice. Once it is found, however, that the employer's
purpose was to affect the outcome of an election, there is no need to find
other unlawful conduct.
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
1. MANDATORY SUBJECTS OF BARGAINING
A. Employer's Decision to Subcontract
In view of several recent circuit court opinions reaching different con-
clusions, the Supreme Court has accepted Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v.
NLRB 16 for certiorari on the issue: Whether an employer violates section
8(a) (5) by making an economic decision in the exercise of his business
111 Supra note 108, at 1064.
112 375 U.S. 405 (1964).
118 Id. at 407.
" 4 Id. at 409.
116 Id. at 410.
tie 375 U.S. 963 (1964).
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judgment to subcontract work previously performed by union employees
without first bargaining with the union? In other words: Is such a decision
under those circumstances a mandatory subject of bargaining?
The pre-1961 Board did not regard such a decision as within the
mandatory subjects outlined in the national act. The old Board in Fibreboard
Paper Prods. Carp 1 17 indicated that the employer's motivation for such a
decision was the determining factor in finding a refusal to bargain in good
faith. Shortly after the Board's initial decision in Fibreboard, the appoint-
ment of two new members altered the composition and philosophy of that
tribunal. The new Board accepted a petition in Fibreboard for rehearing.
Before the rehearing, however, the Board decided Town & Country Mfg.
Co."8 and overruled the old Board's position in Fibreboard, finding that an
employer's unilateral decision to subcontract work previously performed by
union employees violates section 8(a) (5), notwithstanding a failure to find
anti-union animus. Thus, the Board ruled that an employer is under a duty to
bargain over an economic decision to subcontract. Subsequently, the Board
reversed Fibreboard"° on the basis of its decision in Town & Country.
During the past year, both Fibreboard and Town & Country reached
the circuit court level. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the Board in Town &
Country v. NLRB, 12° holding that the employer violated sections 8(a) (3),
(5) & (1) by terminating its trailer hauling operations and contracting out
that phase of its work without first bargaining with the union. The basis
of the court's holding, however, was the finding that the employer's decision
was motivated at least in part by a desire to rid himself of the union and
thus, not by a mere refusal to bargain over an economic decision.
The Board position was affirmed in toto by the District of Columbia
Circuit in Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 121 which found that the
employer's unilateral decision to subcontract was an illegal refusal to bargain,
though not based upon anti-union animus. The court rejected the em-
ployer's contention that such an economic decision came within the manage-
ment prerogative. The court noted that Congress imposed the duty to bargain
upon the parties to a collective bargaining agreement in order to establish a
structure of self-government for a particular plant. It was felt that this
would "create an environment conducive to industrial harmony and eliminate
costly industrial strife which interrupts .commerce."' 22 The court reasoned
that Congress purposely specified the mandatory subjects of bargaining in
the broadest terms—wages, hours and conditions of employment—to leave
it ". . . to the Board in the first instance, to give content to the statutory
language, subject to review by the courts." 123 The court stated that it was
In 130 N.L.R.B. 1558, 47 L.R.R.M. 1547 (1961).
118 136 N.L.R.B. 1022, 49 L.R.R.M. 1918 (1962). The Board relied heavily upon
the Supreme Court's decision in Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago and Nw R.R. Co.,
362 U.S. 330 (1960), which held that an employer commits an 8(a) (5) violation when he
unilaterally abolishes jobs though for economic reasons.
112 138 N.L.R.B. 550, 51 L.R.R.M. 1101 (1962).
120 316 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1963).
121 322 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
122 Id. at 414.
128 Ibid.
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". . . not necessary that it be likely or probable that the union will yield or
supply a feasible solution but rather that the union be afforded an oppor-
tunity to meet management's legitimate complaints that [maintenance of
hired employees] was unduly costly. )7124
The Eighth Circuit recently arrived at an opposite conclusion to that
of the D.C. Circuit on the precise question presented in Fibreboard. The
court in NLRB v. Adams Dairy Inc.' 25 held that an employer does not
commit a section 8(a) (5 ) violation by refusing to bargain over an economic
decision, not motivated by anti-union animus, to subcontract work previously
performed by members of a bargaining unit. The court started with the
proposition that an economic decision to subcontract or to cease operations
completely is within the management prerogative 129 so long as it is neither
predicated upon an illegal intent nor produces discriminatory results. Since
the petition for enforcement was not based upon the employer's subjective
illegal intent (Town & Country), the court proceeded to examine whether, as
in NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 127 the " 'conduct by its very nature con-
tained the implications of the required intent.'' 128 The court concluded
that although the decision to subcontract would oust employees from their
jobs, such a consequence cannot be said to naturally tend to discourage
union membership. Furthermore, "Union membership is not a guarantee
against legitimate or justifiable discharge or discharge motivated by economic
necessity."129 Finding no subjective illegaiintent or objective illegal result,
the court concluded that the employer had not committed an unfair labor
practice by unilaterally replacing union employees with independent con-
tractors. The court determined, however, that after the decision to subcon-
tract had been made, section 8(a)(5) required the employer to negotiate
with respect to the treatment of discharged employees on such matters as
severance pay.
Whether an employer is required to bargain as to the decision (Fibre-
board) to subcontract as distinguished from the effects (Adams Dairy) of
such a decision will be answered by the Supreme Court in Fibreboard.
A distinguishable factual situation from those previously discussed arose
in a recent decision, Hawaii Meat Co. v. NLRB.'" The Board had taken the
position that an employer violates section 8(a) (5 ) if he unilaterally decides
124 Ibid.
124 322 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1963). The court distinguished Town & Country as
involving anti-union animus.
124 The court quoted from NLRB v. New England Web, Inc., 309 F.2d 696 (1st
Cir. 1962) among others, wherein the employer's decision to close its plant was solely
for business reasons free from anti-union animus. The court in New England Web
stated:
We start with the proposition that a businessman still retains the un-
trammeled prerogative to close his enterprise when in the exercise of a legitimate
and justified business judgment he concludes that such a step is either eco-
nomically desirable or economically necessary.
Id. at 700.
127 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
122 Id. at 227.
129 Supra note 125, at 557.
122 321 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1963).
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to subcontract work previously performed by employees then engaged in
an economic strike."' It was the court's opinion, however, that the existence
of an economic strike removed the case from the Fibreboard and Town &
Country classification. The holding in NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. 132.
to the effect that an employer is not under a duty to bargain over a decision
to permanently replace economic strikers was held applicable to this fact
situation. The court, in reversing the Board, held that it is no more proper
for the Board to intrude upon the employer's decision to subcontact to keep
going than to intrude upon a decision to permanently replace individual
strikers.'" To conclude otherwise, determined the court, would be to permit
the Board to sit in judgment upon every economic weapon of the parties."'
While the court found no distinction between replacing economic strikers
permanently and subcontracting out their work permanently, query whether
the comparative effect upon unionism of the two courses of action warrants
that distinction be drawn. The' subcontracting .,out of work results in the
total abolition of the bargaining unit. PeiManently. replacing economic
strikers does not have as harsh results since the union remains the certified
exclusive bargaining representative. The company, has not rid itself of the
union as it has where economic strikers are replaCed with independent con-
tractors.
B. Employer's Decision to Discontinue Operations
The controversial issue presented in Darlington Mfg. Co. 135 moved one
step closer to possible resolution by the Supreme Court with the refusal by the
Fourth Circuit to enforce the Board's order. The Board had refused to
accept the employer's assertion that it had an absolute right to 'go out of
business, holding that an employer violates section 8(a) (3) where his de-
cision to discontinue operations is based in part upon anti-union motivation.
This element was considered sufficient to constitute "discrimination in regard
to hire or tenure of employment.'" 36
Stimulating almost as much comment by its order, as by its decision, the
Board ordered Darlington Company to pay the discharged employees back
pay until they were able to obtain substantially equivalent employment or
until they were put on a preferential hiring list of Deering Milliken, Inc.,
a company found to occupy a single employer status with Darlington. In
addition, the Board made Deering Milliken, Inc., and its affiliates liable for
131 139 N.L.R.B. 966, 51 L.R.R.M. 1430 (1962).
132 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
133 The court found that the practical effect of requiring the employer to bargain
over a decision to subcontract would 'be to' eliminate that method of meeting the
strike since the resultant delay from an obligation to bargain would render this means
valueless to the struck employer.
134 NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960) was cited by the court
as authority for the proposition enunciated.
135 139 N.L.R.B. 241, 51 L.R.R.M. 1278 (1962). For an extensive 'discussion of
the Darlington decision at the Board level, see Segal and Teagan, Some Comments on
the Right of an Employer to Go Out of Business: The Darlington Case, 4 B.C. Ind.
& Com. L. Rev. 581 (1963).
136 Id. at 247, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1280.
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back pay to the same extent as Darlington:ykinally, Milliken was ordered
to offer etnployin'ent . • to •cliscbarged 'workerihn its other plants without
prejudice to their;seniority and other privileges3nd to pay the expenses of
Moving the :.wdilters and their families '-to ithose locations.
Darlington . and Milliken petitioned `to vacate the Board's order, while
the union petitioned to expand it to reqygth'inarlington to resume operations
and reinstate the employees. The courts ?Weals, in a three to two opin-
' ion,1" held that it was Darlington's	 ArUiewprerogative to permanently
.• -Close its business in whole or in	
)
pr vilFers1 that the discontinuance is
	. 1,2,,-,tactual, unfeigned and perman. 	 411P 	 nor subcontract, nor
„.a change merely in the foini 	 „ t ,:ritairh 	.,atity."138 The court reasoned
••y,s. i•
	 .f . 'that:
.	 •
n.• fundarr	 lintd..cnilational Labor Relations Act
t •
•iñ to.1. -vc	 uLuas of both industry and labor so
•
long at. C.■ 	 '	 311..1(.Artiship of employer and employee. But
• the Matti: , 	"- lied that province. It does not compel





i..;:;ployer. Either may withdraw from that
I 	 .
, tong as the obligations of any employment
Such withdrawal . . . itself does not create
. ,Ao .ther the employer, or the employee to the other
. If a cessation of business is adopted to avoid
, :*(11:he proprietor pays the price of it: permanent dis-
'fiis business in whole or in part?" (Empahsis supplied.)
art concluded that "Power to command an employer to stay
in MI , : -is indefinitely, or assess him with damages for permanently going
OA11 Ali business, is not a National Labor Relations Board prerogative." 140J Inv -
n ine
 Admitting that there was no decision directly in point, the court cited
simreral cases as supporting an employer's right to go out of business for
economic reasons, but the court noted that those cases did not declare the
existence of such reason as indispensable to the validity of the closing. 141
It was the court's opinion that those cases could stand as authority for the
proposition that if termination were permanent, the power to close, though
based in part upon anti-union motivation, is not precluded by the Act.
There is no question that there is no case directly in point. The cases
relied upon by the majority and minority have distinguishing features from
Darlington. New England Web 192
 was based upon a finding by the court that
the employer's decision to close was predicated upon economic factors, one
187 325 F.2d 682 (4th Cir. 1963).
188 Id. at 685.
188 Ibid.
140 Supra note 137, at 687.
141 NLRB v. Preston Feed Corp., 309 F.2d 346 (4th Cir. 1962); NLRB v. New
England Web, Inc., 309 F.2d 696 (1st Cir. 1962); NLRB v. Rapid Bindery Inc., 293
F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961); Union Drawn. Steel Co. v. NLRB, 109 F.2d 587 (3d Cir.
1940).
142 Supra note 141.
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of which could be the advent of the union. Preston Feed Carp 148 and Mis-
souri Transit Co.'" did not involve a closedown, but merely the discon-
tinuance of a segment of the business.
In another recent circuit court opinion, NLRB v. Savoy Laundry, Inc.,148
the Second Circuit agreed with the Board that an employer's decision to
discontinue a division of its oration when based upon a desire to rid it-
self of the union violated the 	 RA. This would appear to conflict with
the Fourth Circuit's Darlin.	 •,lion which found it within the manage-
ment prerogative to discontic..	 jttons in whole or in part for any reason.
The court, however, reüst.	 Pt'fot'ce the Board's order relating to
reopening the closed depart&R(4 111. I '1.1iy: 'fining of back pay to discharged
employees. It was the courtleotRAMilaqu thiPAliiee years had passed since"
the closing, it would be unduly harsh to }Jr; recmire resumption of operations/
Further, since the back pay ord:. 4,00Foer1riviqiliAtmintertwindd with the
resumption of activities, this part ofirta (dills 91:4Hrizillytremarseirtifor further
* Fit)c ,
	nutCli 911, N(9114consideration.
The discontinuance of operations cni4sar1( c .mbrAthapstantquestions:
(1) Does ari employer- have	 c).:F21.5":444io out.df
business even when his decision is ba"..4g. 	 fliv.&jo




(2) Does an employer have an absoiO .;;V:eks,jip niv •
where his decision is based solely upon economic teasthIRP[4" t`c"





economic decision to discontinue operations?
(4) Is there a distinction between closure of the'',t_15913,utifft.
and the discontinuance of only a segment thereof? 	
-.jou 5dT
	• 	 '
The Board's order in the discontinuance of operations cases (410tritrigton)
does not appear to be consistent with some of its orders in the subt.:
cases (Town & Country). In the former cases, the Board has refused to
the employer to resume operations, ordering a less harsh sanction, despite'tici
fact that the employer was guilty Of anti-union motivation. In some of the
latter cases, on the other.hand, the Board has, in endeavoring to mold the
order to the equities of the situation, ordered a harsher remedy—resumption
of operations—despite the fact that the employer may not be guiltyrof
anti-union animus.
C. Nondiscriminatory 'Hiring Hall Provision 	 - •	 - - -
Section 8(a) (5) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to
refuse to bargain over mandatory subjects of bargaining which are set forth
in section 8(d). Amongst those mandatory subjects are "ternis and condi-
tions of employment." The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Wooster Div. of
Borg-Warner Corp.'" • established the tests to determine whether a subject
falls within that broad classification. •
148 Ibid.
144
.250 F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 1957).
146 55 L.R.R.M. 2285 (2d Cir. 1964).
146 356 U.S. 342 (1958). The Court laid down the following tests:
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The NLRB recently determined in Associated Gen. Contractorsin that
a nondiscriminatory hiring hall fell within that category of mandatory
subjects of bargaining. Applying the tests laid dciwn in Borg-Warner, the
Board found that the subject settled a term or condition of employment
since "employment" connotes ". . . the initial act of employing as well as
the consequent state of being employed. . . .2)148 The Board determined
that the subject satisfied the second test since the standards for regulating
priorities for employment necessarily regulate the relations between an em-
ployer and his employees. In so concluding, the Board determined that the
term "employee" embraced prospective as well as actual employees.'"
Further, the Board placed substantial emphasis upon the fact that in the
industry involved, employees enjoyed only intermittent employment, shuttling
from employer to employer. This situation made such employees concerned
not only with retaining present jobs, but also with job opportunities for
continued employment elsewhere when they were laid off and thus directly
affected by priority standards established by the hiring hall.
The employer's assertion that the hiring hall provision was a form of
union security and thus prohibited by the state's right-to-work-law, was re-
jected by the Board on the basis that it in no way required union member-
ship or other union-oriented condition as a condition of employment.
Members Rodgers and Leedom disagreed with the majority decision that
the hiring hall met the tests established in Borg-Warner for mandatory sub-
jects of bargining. They reasoned that the hiring hall provision settled
". .. no term or condition of employment because the obtaining of employ-
ment is not a term or condition of employment."'" (Emphasis supplied.)
Further, the dissent felt that the provision did not deal with the employer-
employee relationship since applicants for employment are not employees
under section 8(d) and not employees within the bargaining unit. By way
of summation, they reasoned that: "We see no warrant in the Act for com-
pelling an employer to bargain with a union as to nonemployees and as to
matters which antedate the entry of a nonemployee into the bargaining
unit."'"
In concluding that the hiring hall provision is a mandatory subject of
bargaining, the Board has determined that a provision relating to the ob-
taining of employment falls within "terms or conditions of employment."
The dissent asserts that such a conclusion logically will require an employer
(1) Does the subject matter settle any term or condition of employment?
and
(2) Does the subject to be bargained about regulate the relations between
the employer and his employees?
147 143 N.L.R.B. No. 43, 53 L.R.R.M. 1299 (1963).
144 Id. at 1301.
149 The majority's conclusion that the term "employee" encompassed prospective
employees was based upon Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941). The
dissent distinguished the present situation involving "wages, hours and condition of
employment" under section 8(d) from Phelps Dodge which concerned "hire or tenure
of employment or any other condition of employment" appearing in section 8(a)(3).




to bargain over such matters as the size of the labor force and the extent and
timing of the expansion thereof, as well as the per diem allowance for job
applicants summoned for interviews. How far outside the immediate employ-
ment relation mandatory subjects of bargaining extend can only be answered
by future decisions.
2. Loss OF STATUS FOR FAILURE TO GIVE TIMELY NOTICE
UNDER SECTION 8(d)
Mr. Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the majority in NLRB v. Lion
Oil Co.,182 stated that section 8(d) 153 "is susceptible of various interpreta-
tions." 154 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion, enunciated the
task of the judiciary in interpreting that section when he stated:
It has ... become a judicial responsibility to find that interpreta-,
tion which can most fairly be, said to be embedded in, the statute,
in the sense of being most harmonious with its scheme and with the
general purposes that Congress manifested. 155
These pronouncements in Lion Oil foreshadowed the extreme difficulty
and disagreement which that section has engendered among the members of
the Board when that body has been called upon to shed light upon the
meaning of section 8(d).
In Retail Clerks Union (J. C. Penny),156 the Board had to determine
the application of the sixty-day strike prohibition provided in subsection
8(d) (4) to the notice provision of subsection 8(d) (3). The Board therein
held that subsection 8(d) (3) imposed an affirmative duty upon a party who
desires to terminate or modify a collective bargaining agreement to notify
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service to that effect. The Board
concluded that the strike prohibition in subsection 8(d) (4) applies to the
thirty-day notice provision of subsection 8(d) (3) as well as to the sixty-day
notice provision of subsection 8(d) (1 ). Thus, if the union strikes prior to
152 352 U.S. 282 (1957)!
153 Section 8(d) requires in part:
. . . that no party to [a collective bargaining contract] shall terminate
or modify such contract, unless the party desiring such termination or modifica-
tion-
1. serves a written notice upon the other party to the contract of the
proposed termination or modification sixty days prior to the expiration date
thereof ... ;
3. notifies the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service within thirty
days after such notice of the existence of a dispute, and simultaneously
therewith notifies any State or Territorial agency established to mediate
and conciliate disputes . withirt_the State or Territory where the dispute
occurred, provided no agreement has been reached by that time; and
4. continues in full force and effect, without resorting to strike or lock-
out, all terms and conditions of the existing contract for a period of
sixty days aftersuch notice is given or until the expiration date, of such
contract, whichever occurs later.... (Emphasis supplied.)
154 .Supra note 152, at 288.
158 Id. at 297.
llso 109 N.L.R.B. 754, 34 L.R.R.M. 1420 (1954). Member Murdock dissented.
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giving proper notice under both subsections, the strike violates subsection
8(d)(4).
J. C. Penny involved a total failure to give notice under subsection
8(d) (3). In a subsequent decision, Retail Clerks Ina Ass'n,'" the Board held
that where a delayed notice had been given under subsection 8(d) (3), the
employees violated the no-strike provision of subsection 8(d)(4) by strik-
ing within thirty days after notice had been given even though the required
sixty-day notice under subsection 8(d) (1) had been given and sixty days had
elapsed.
Section 8(d) imposes an extremely severe sanction upon an employee
who strikes in violation of subsection 8(d) (4). 168 The employee loses his sta-
tus as an employee. He thus loses his rights under the Act and• can be dis-
charged with impunity. No other section imposes as harsh a sanction for vio-
lation of its provisions as does section 8(d). The severity of the `;loss-of-
status" provision demonstrates a congressional purpose to insure that the
notice provisions and waiting periods of section 8(d) are complied with.
In June 1963, the Board in Fort Smith Chair Co.'" held that the "loss-
of-status" provision in section 8(d) applies to a strike which is called before
the notice provisions of subsection 8(d) (3) have been complied with. Thus,
an employee who engages in a strike which is unlawful under subsection
8(d) (4) because he fails to comply with the notice provisions of both sub-
sections 8(d) (1) and (3) loses his status as an employee under the Act.
In Fort Smith, notice had been given as required by subsection 8(d)(1) and
sixty days had elapsed, but the notice provision of subsection 8(d)(3) had
not been complied With.
Prior to this decision, there was no question that the "loss-of-status"
provision applied to a strike either prior to notice being given under sub-
section 8(d)(1) or within sixty days of such notice. The illegally striking
employees lost their status as employees and could be discharged. Such was
clearly discernable from the language of section 8(d). The Board in Fort
Smith split, however, on:whether the "loss-of-status" provision also applied
to a strike subsequent to compliance with subsection 8(d) (1) and the run-
ning of sixty days but prior to the fulfilling of the thirty-day notice provi-
sion of subsection 8(d) (3).
The majority concluded that the "loss-of-status" provision applies where
a strike occurs prior to compliance with both subsections 8(d)(1) and (3)
and the elapsing of sixty and thirty days respectively. In so concluding, the
majority read section 8(d) as a whole, in light of its purposes as well as
the purposes of the Act, which indicated that the "loss-of-status" provision
is designed to ensure the maximum effectiveness of the mediation device for
the full thirty-day period. It was the Board's conclusion that since J. C.
157 120 N.L.R.B. 272, 41 L.R.R.M. 1479 (1958), cord, Retail Clerk's Ass'n v. NLRB,
265 F.2d 814 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
158 The "loss-of-status" provision states that:
Any employee who engages- in a strike within the sixty -day period sped-
Bed in this subsection shall. lose his status as an employee of the employer en-
gaged in the particular labor dispute, for the purposes of sections 8, 9, and 10
of this [Act]. . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
158 143 N.L.R.B. No 28, 53 L.R.R.M. , 1313 ' , (1963)7',
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Penny required that a full thirty days elapse before employees can strike
where late notice is given under subsection 8(d) (3), even though subsection
8(d) (1) has been complied with and sixty days have elapsed, a parity of
reasoning requires that the sixty-day period specified in the "loss-of-status"
provision be subject to the same interpretation to protect that period for
mediation. In so reasoning, the Board determined that "... the loss-of-status
provision is applicable not only to strikes within the initial sixty-day period,
but also to those strikes beginning less than thirty days after service of the
8(d) (3) notices, or, with respect to the present case, to those occurring ab-
sent the filing of such notices."'"
Chairman McCulloch concurred, finding the existence of the unprotected
activity sufficient to permit the discharge of the striking employees. Member
Fanning dissented on the basis that the "loss-of-status" provision is re-
stricted to strikes prior to compliance with subsection 8(d) (1) or the run-
ning of sixty days.
The majority's opinion in Fort Smith would appear to be consistent
with the Board's decision in J. C. Penny. The Board has apparently fol-
lowed the reasoning, set forth in its brief and approved by the circuit court
in Retail Clerks Ass'n v. NLRB,'" as to why Congress did not expressly pro-
hibit strikes within thirty days of notice under subsection 8(d)(3) when
it explicitly prohibited strikes within sixty days of notice under subsection
8(d)(1). The Board therein concluded that Congress did not expressly
prohibit strikes within thirty days of notice under subsection 8(d) (3) be-
cause it assumed that the thirty-day period fell within the sixty-thy period
of subsection 8(d) (1) and that there was thus no need to do so. 162 Using a
parity of reasoning, it would appear that although the "loss-of-status" pro-
vision does not specifically refer to the thirty-day period Congress assumed
that it also was automatically covered by the sixty-day period and thus
it was unnecessary for the "loss-of-status" provision to contain any specific
reference to the thirty-day period.
The Fort Smith decision demonstrates the severe consequences which
can result if an employee strikes before all the applicable notice provisions
of section 8(d) are complied with. The employee loses his rights under the
Act and is subject to discharge by his employer. It is clear that Congress
intended to reserve the periods specified in section 8(d), during which em-
ployees are not to strike, for consultation and settlement of disputes relating
to termination and modification of collective bargaining agreements. While
the sanctions are severe, Congress considered them justified in light of the
policy of the national act to maintain a free and unimpeded flow of com-
merce.
3. LIMITATION ON RIGHT TO TAKE UNILATERAL ACTION
AFTER IMPASSE
An employer commits an unlawful refusal to bargain under section
8(a)(5) by unilaterally changing matters which are subjects of mandatory
166 Supra note 159, at 1315-16.
161 Supra note 157.
162 Id. at 279.
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bargaining under section 8(d).'" This is true although the employer's con-
duct in toto does not evince subjective bad faith bargaining.'" The Supreme
Court in NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 165 recognized an important
exception to the foregoing principles. Where the parties have reached a bona
fide impasse in their negotiations, the employer may lawfully institute uni-
lateral changes previously rejected by the union, even though they involve
mandatory subjects of bargaining.'"
The Third Circuit in Marine & Shipbuilding Workers v. NLRB, 1 °7
recently engrafted an important limitation upon the employer's right to
unilaterally institute changes after an impasse has been reached. The court
held that the deadlock in bargaining does not constitute an impasse justifying
the employer taking unilateral action, where that deadlock is the result of
the employer's refusal to bargain. In so concluding, the court found that the
Board, in ruling that the existence of an impasse permitted unilateral action
without regard to the cause of the impasse, had not given proper consider-
ation to the employer's unfair labor practices.
The court upheld the Board's finding that the employer had committed
a per se violation of section 8(a) (5), similar to that found by the Supreme
Court in NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 1 °8 by insisting upon
a change in the grievance procedure which would require all grievances to be
signed by the individual employee. The proposal was not considered a man-
datory subject within section 8(d) since it had the effect not of condition-
ing employment, but of limiting the union's representation as did the "ballot
clause" in Borg-Warner.
The court ruled that the employer did not violate the act by unilaterally
discontinuing the union shop and check-off provisions in the expired contract,
since these provisions were dependent upon the existence of a valid contract.
It was determined, however, that the employer did violate section 8(a) (5)
in unilaterally terminating the preferential seniority accorded union repre-
sentatives and the grievance procedure provided in the old contract. These
provisions did not require the existence of a collective bargaining agreement.
This decision places an important limitation upon an employer's right
to take unilateral action after a bargaining impasse has been reached. Such
unilateral action will be illegal if that impasse stems from the employer's
violation of section 8(a)(5). While the decision dealt with a per se viola-
tion resulting from the employer's bargaining to the point of insistence upon
a non-mandatory subject, it is evident that its rationale will cover a violation
of section 8(a) (5) resulting from the employer's subjective bad faith.
163 NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
164 Ibid.
165 343 U.S. 395 (1952). 	 •
166 Compare NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., 337 U.S. 217 (1949), where
the Supreme Court found unlawful the employer's unilateral institution of a wage in-
crease substantially greater than that offered the union during negotiations.
• 	 167 53 L.R.R.M. 2878 (3d Cir. 1963) (otherwise known as Bethlehem Steel Co.).
168 356 U.S. 342 (1958). But see, dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Harlan, where
he concluded. that the •majority's-statement -that - an employer can "propose" a permissive
subject of bargaining, but not "insist" upon it as •a condition ' to agreement, has the




4. DISCRIMINATORY INITIATION FEE
. While several prior decisions had been handed down by the Board,'"
the recent Third Circuit opinion in NLRB v. Television Employees170 appears
to be the first court decision interpreting section 8(b)(5) 1 71 The court
sustained the Board's finding that "under all the circumstances" an increase
in the union's initiation fee from fifty to five hundred dollars was excessive
and discriminatory. The Board had found that the increase was motivated by
a desire on the part of the union to restrain the employer from hiring part-
time employees, which practice the union regarded as a threat to the job
security of regular full-time union employees.
The Board had rejected the union's assertion that section 8(b) (5) was
only intended to prohibit maintenance of a closed shop by an excessive or
discriminatory fee, finding that it also was designed to proscribe the con-
duct of the union here involved.
The court expressly approved the criteria utilized by the Board in ex-
amining whether the fee falls within the proscriptions of section 8(6)(5).
The initiation fee under examination was compared with those charged by
other unions in the same field, together with the wages earned by the respec-
tive members of those unions. In addition, the size of the increase and the
circumstances surrounding its institution were analyzed.
Of particular interest was the Board's order requiring reimbursement
of all fees in excess of fifty dollars to the affected employees. The court re-
fused to upset the order, finding that the Board did not abuse its discretion
in using fifty dollars as the basis for its order, although a higher fee may
not have been excessive or discriminatory.
The case is important because it is the initial court approval of the
Board's interpretation of section 8(b) (5) and of the Board's criteria for
determining whether a given initiation fee is "excessive or discriminatory
under all the circumstances."
5 EMPLOYER'S RIGHT TO LOCKOUT
What action can members of a multi-employer bargaining group take
when a union which bargains with the group suddenly calls a strike against
one of its members (whipsaw strike)? In 1957, the Supreme Court upheld
10 Television & Radio Broadcasting Studio Employees, 135 N.L.R.B. 632, 49
L.R.R.M. 1541 (1962) ; Motion Picture Screen Cartoonists, 121 N.L.R.B. 1196, 42
L.R.R.M. 1540 (1958) ; Ferro Stamping & Mfg. Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 1459, 27 L.R.R.M.
1593 (1951).
170 52 L.R.R.M. 2774 (3d Cir. 1963).
171 Section 8(b) (5) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-
5. to require of employees, covered by an agreement authorized under
subsection (a) (3) of this the payment, as a condition precedent
to becoming a member of such organization, of a fee in an . amount which
the Board finds excessive or discrimatory under all the circumstances. In
making such a finding, the Board shall consider, among other relevant
factors, the practices and customs of labor organizations in the particular
industry, and the wages currently paid to the employees affected, . . .
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the right of non-struck members to lockout their employees as a defensive
measure to protect their common interest in group bargaining.'"
Recently, the Tenth Circuit in NLRB v. Brown"8 reversed the Board,'"
holding that it is not per se illegal for non-struck members of a multi-employer
bargaining group to hire temporary replacements following a group-wide
lockout.
The Board had ruled that while Buffalo Linen authorizes non-struck
members of the group to take defensive measures by way of locking out
their employees to protect the integrity of a multi-employer bargaining unit,
the hiring of replacements for locked out employees was not defensive but
retaliatory and designed to inhibit a lawful strike in violation of section
8(a) (3). The Board reasoned that "If the struck member operates through
replacements, no economic necessity exists for the other members' shutting
down."'"
In reversing, the court concluded that the Board, by prohibiting non-
struck members from hiring temporary replacements, had misconstrued and ,
misapplied Buffalo Linen. The court reasoned that the Supreme Court went
no further than to permit non-struck members to lockout in Buffalo Linen
because the fact situation went no further.
The court noted that under Mackay,17° a struck employer has the
right to hire replacements to keep his business in operation and that the
lockout right given the group in Buffalo Linen would be rendered largely il-
lusory if non-struck members of the group were prohibited from also hiring
replacements. This conclusion followed, said the court, because if the entire
group remained closed down, the struck employer would be denied his
rights under Mackay to hire replacements and the "whipsaw" would enjoy
a privileged advantage. On the other hand, if the struck member should
decide to hire replacements and the other members of the bargaining group
could not, the non-struck members would be deterred from exercising the
lockout and the "whipsaw" would win again. It was the court's opinion that
this was not the intent of Buffalo Linen, which held that a lockout is justified
to preserve the integrity of a multi-employer bargaining unit.
There is little question that the decision in Brown accords the employer
group much greater ability to combat a "whipsaw" strike than was sustained
by the Supreme Court in Buffalo Linen. Not only are the members of the
group permitted to lockout non-striking employees, but they are authorized
to replace them. This appears to be more than defensive action designed to
neutralize the effect of the "whipsaw." The employer enjoys a substantial
advantage by being able to continue operating. While there is no specific
prohibition on the use of the lockout by an employer under the national
act, it does not enjoy the favored status and protection accorded the right
to strike. The court, in reversing the Board, appears to be primarily con-
cerned with preserving the effectiveness of the lockout at the expense of
172 NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449 (Buffalo Linen), 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
173 319 F.2d 7 (10th Cir. 1963). The court split two to one.
174 137 N.L.R.B. 73, 50 L.R.R.M. 1046 (1962).
176 Id. at 76, 50 L.R.R.M. at 1048.
176 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
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the strike. While striving to prevent the right to lockout from being rendered
nugatory, query whether the court has rendered the right to strike illusory
under the circumstances presented. Whether the members of a multi-employer
bargaining unit enjoy such a prerogative will be answered shortly by the
Supreme Court. 177
In New York Mailers' Union v. NLRB,'" the Second Circuit recently
upheld the Board, holding that an association of newspaper publishers did
not violate sections 8(a) (1) or (3) by maintaining and implementing an
association-wide agreement whereby all members agreed to suspend publi-
cation in the event that one or more members were struck over a grievance
dispute. The court read the binding arbitration provision in the collective
bargaining agreements as a commitment not to strike over grievances, acid
reasoned that a violation of this commitment involved an attack upon the
contract provisions designed to prevent work stoppages and a threat to the
common interest of all publishers in bargaining on a multi-employer basis.
Both the Board and the court felt that Buffalo Linen required the
conclusion that the defensive action taken by the association to protect the
integrity of association-wide bargaining was permissible. Though there were
distinguishing aspects between the Buffalo Linen and the Mailers' cases, the
important point is that in both cases, the strike was used to threaten
". . . the destruction of the employers' interest in bargaining on a group-
wide basis.'" 79
6. DISCRIMINATION "PER SE"
A. Super-seniority
The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp. 18° held that it is
a violation of sections 8(a) (1), (3) and (5) for an employer to grant
super-seniority to strike replacements and to strikers who abandon the
strike and return to work, notwithstanding the fact that the employer's
motivation was not subjectively discriminatory. 181 Where the conduct in-
volved, by its very nature, contains the required illegal intent, specific
evidence of subjective intent is unnecessary. 182 This is true even though the
employer's subjective motivation was to further legitimate business ends.
• . . . [H]is conduct does speak for itself—it is discriminatory and
it does discourage union membership and whatever the claimed
177 375 U.S. 962 (1964). In a recent decision, the Board,. while recognizing the
right of a non-struck member of a multi-employer bargaining unit to lockout for de-
fensive purposes, held that a non-struck employer violates section 8(a)(3) by re-
suming operations with supervisory or clerical personnel. Kroger Co., 145 N.L.R.B.
No. 26, 54 L.R.R.M. 1361 (1963).
178 55 L.R.R.M. 2287 (2d Cir. 1964).
179 Id. at 2291.
188 Cert. granted, 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
181 The Sixth Circuit had agreed with the Board that super-seniority was per se
discriminatory in Swarco, Inc. v. NLRB, 303 F.2d 668 (6th Cir. 1962). The Third Cir-
cuit in Erie Resistor Corp. v. NLRB, 303 F.2d 359 (3d Cir. 1962) and the Ninth Cir-
cuit in NLRB v, Potlatch Forest, Inc., 189 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1951) felt that super-
seniority was not illegal absent a showing of an illegal motive.
182 Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
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overriding justification may be, it carries with it unavoidable conse-
quences which the employer not only foresaw but which he must
have intended.'"
The Court examined and compared the damage wrought by super-
seniority' to the union with the business purpose of the employer in
using such a device and concluded that:
[I]n view of the deference paid the strike weapon by the federal
labor laws and the devastating consequences upon it which the
Board found was and would be precipitated by respondent's in-
herently discriminatory super-seniority plan, we cannot say that the
Board erred in the balance which it struck here lea
The Court was careful to announce that it was not questioning the
validity of the Mackay rule, but that that rule should not be extended to
include the granting of super-seniority.
The Board in Laclede Metal Prods. Co.'" recently held that since em-
ployees have a statutory right to strike, it is an unfair labor practice under
the rationale of Erie Resistor for an employer and a union to agree to a
super-seniority plan. They cannot agree to such a discrimination regardless
155 Supra note 180, at 228.
151 The characteristics of super-seniority as set forth by the Board were:
(1) Super-seniority affects the tenure of all strikers whereas permanent re-
placement proper, under Mackay, affects only those who are, in actuality, re-
placed. It is one thing to say that a striker is subject to loss of his job at the
strike's end but quite another to hold that in addition to the threat of re-
placement, all strikers will at best return to their jobs with seniority inferior
to that of the replacements and of those who left the strike.
(2) A super-seniority award necessarily operates to the detriment of those
who participated in the strike as compared to nonstrikers.
(3) Super-seniority made available to striking bargaining unit employees as
well as to new employees is in effect offering individual benefits to the
strikers to induce them to abandon the strike.
(4) Extending the benefits of super-seniority to striking bargaining unit
employees as well as to new replacements deals a crippling blow to the strike
effort. At one stroke, those with low seniority have the opportunity to ob-
tain the job security which ordinarily only long years of service can bring,'
while conversely, the accumulated seniority of older employees is seriously
diluted. This combination of threat and promise could be expected to under-
mine the strikers' mutual interest and place the entire strike effort in
jeopardy. . . .
(5) Super-seniority renders future bargaining difficult, if not impossible, for
the collective bargaining representative. Unlike the replacements granted in
Mackay which ceases to be an issue once the strike is over, the plan here
creates a cleavage in the plant continuing long after the strike is ended.
Employees are henceforth divided into two camps: those who stayed with
the union and those who returned before the end of the strike and thereby
gained extra seniority. This breach is re-emphasized with each subsequent
layoff and stands as an ever-present reminder of the dangers connected with
striking and with union activities in general.
Id. at 230-31.
155 Id. at 235-36.
18° 144 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 53 L.R.R.M. 1514 (1963).
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of whether the agreement resulted from the insistence of the employer or
the voluntary acceptance by the union.
Upon a careful reading of Erie Resistor, the question arises: How broad
is the Supreme Court's decision? Upon close scrutiny of the characteristics
of super-seniority as viewed by the Board and approved by the Court,""
it is clear that the fact that super-seniority was offered to strikers who
would abandon the strike as well as to replacements was of critical im-
portance. Query whether the Court would have reached the same result
if the super-seniority had been offered to only the replacements as an
incentive to fill the jobs vacated by the strikers and not to the strikers.
Consider also the possibility that unlike the employer in Erie Resistor, an
employer located in an area of high employment, must offer an incentive
such as super-seniority if he is to attract replacements. If these two factors
are thus changed, it is questioned whether the holding in Erie Resistor
would require a conclusion that super-seniority in such circumstances is
discriminatory per se.
B. Limitation on Finding of "Per Discrimination
It is well-settled that a finding of unlawful discrimination under section
8(a) (3) requires proof of the employer's intent to encourage or discourage
union membership.' 88 As shown in Erie Resistor,'" however, there are in-
stances where it is unnecessary to prove a specific illegal intent. Where the
actions complained of are so discriminatory on their face and the natural
and probable consequences of such discrimination so clear, the actions them-
selves have been found to contain the required indica of unlawful
motivation.'"
The Sixth Circuit in Quality Castings Co. v. NLRB"' recently drew
an important distinction regarding a finding of per se discrimination. The
court noted that each case which has dispensed with specific proof of an
illegal intent has involved action blatantly discriminatory on its face.
"That is, it has been openly and avowedly directed solely at a group of
people who have participated, in one manner or another, in certain actions
which are specifically protected, concerted activities within the meaning of
the Act."'" (Emphasis supplied.) The court, in refusing to find a per se
discrimination unless the group so affected is composed solely of those
persons engaged in protected conduct, adhered to the rationale of the Ninth
Circuit in Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. NLRB.'° 3 Finding that the
187 Supra note 184.
188 Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954). This is the landmark
case on proof of intent necessary to prove a section 8(a)(3) violation.
189 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
190 Supra note 188, at 45.
191 54 L.R.R.M. 2674 (6th Cir. 1963). The Board with two members dissenting,
had found that new rules promulgated by the employer which excluded sixty-four
workers, who were not taken back after a strike, from sharing in the company's profit-
sharing plan for the striking year constituted a per se discrimination under section
8(a) (3). 139 N.L.R.B. 66, 51 L.R.R.M. 1422 (1962).
192 54 L.R.R.M. at 2677:
193 284 F.2d 74 (9th Cir. 1960). The court held that to establish a conclusive pre-
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actions were not specifically and solely directed at persons engaged in pro-
tected conduct, ". . . but . . . at a group defined by other than union mem-
bership or activity criteria, and which clearly includes others who did not
engage in the protected, concerted activities . .. ," 1°4 the court required
specific proof of an unlawful intent to discriminate.
It is important to note that the Quality Castings decision does not pre-
clude a finding that the employer violated section 8(a) (3). It merely
demands specific proof of his unlawful motivation.
7. SECONDARY BOYCOTTS
A. Common Situs Picketing
Since 1950, when the Board decided the Moore Dry Dock case,'"
the standards established by the Board for distinguishing between lawful
primary and unlawful secondary picketing at a common situs have been
widely accepted. But while the "formula" remains the same, the Board has
held that it should and would not be applied on a per se basis?" and that
failure to follow any of the criteria strictly would not thereby create unlawful
picketing. Compliance need only be substantial.
Having firmly established the standards for lawful common situs
picketing, the Board is now in the process of filling out what it considers
to be "substantial compliance." Two recent cases have dealt with what
will be sufficient to establish whether the primary employer is engaged in
his normal business operations at the situs.
In New Power Wire & Elec. Corp.!" the International Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers sought to organize fifty-eight new electricians of the
company, which was then engaged in rewiring work in several apartment
buildings. Thirty-two of the nonunion employees went out on strike, picketing
sumption of intent within the meaning of section 8(a)(3) as interpreted in Radio
Officers, supra note 182, two factors must be shown:.
(1) ". . . the encouragement or discouragement of union membership must
be a natural and forseeable consequence of the employer's discrimination."
[And,]
(2) ". . . the discrimination itself must be based solely upon the criterion of
union membership."
The court regarded this second factor of the utmost importance since ". .. if every dis-
criminatory action taken by an employer which could forseeably result in the encourage-
ment or discouragement of union membership were proscribed by the Act, very few of
the legitimate prerogatives of management could .survive the flood of unfair labor prac-
tice charges." Id. at 82 - 3. . . . - '
194 Supra note 191, at 2678. The new rules for sharing in the profit-sharing plan
for the previous year not only excluded the sixty-four strikers who were not taken
back, but seven others who were taken back after the strike.
196 Sailors' Union of the Pacific (Moore Dry Dock), 92 N.L.R.B. 547, 27 L.R.R.M.
1108 (1950). To be lawful primary activity, the following conditions must be met: (1)
picketing must occur only when the situs of the dispute is located on the neutral
premises; (2) picketing must be limited to limes when the primary employer is. en-
gaged in his normal business at the situs; (3) the picketing must take place reasonably
close to the situs; and (4) clear notice must be given to indicate that the dispute is
with the primary employer.
196 Plauche Elec., Inc., 135 N.L.R.B. 250, 49 L.R.R.M. 1446 .(1962).
197 144 N.L.R.B. No. 100, 54 L.R.R.M. 1178 ,(1963).
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the company headquarters and several of the apartment houses. The
picketing continued during periods when no primary employees were working
at the situs, although those employees not on strike would return at various
times. In addition, the company had left materials at the various projects
and supervisers made frequent appearances. As soon as the employer's opera-
tions were completed at a particular site, the pickets left. The Trial Examiner
found an unlawful secondary boycott since picketing occurred when primary
employees were absent for substantial periods of time. The Board, in re-
versing the mechanical approach of the Trial Examiner, held that the
picketing substantially complied with the Moore Dry Dock tests; the absence
of the primary employees constituting one factor in considering whether
the dispute was located at the common situs and whether the employer was
engaged in normal business at that situs.
In making this determination, the Board found it necessary to evaluate
the absence of the primary employees on the following points:
(a) the company's contractual obligation to perform the rewiring
work at each of the picketed apartment houses; (b) the fact that
the company was engaged in performance of its contracts at each
of the sites and company employees were working at the sites
when the picketing started; (c) the visits to the sites by company
supervisors, made almost daily; (d) the fact that work was inter-
mittently resumed at each of the sites; (e) the company's efforts
to recruit new employees for work at the sites; (f) the cessation
of picketing when the company completed its contracts at a particu-
lar apartment building; (g) the fact that the picketing occurred
during a normal workday; (h) the further fact that the picketing
was not conducted at a construction site where substantial com-
plements of other employers' employees were worlcing. 1"
The culmination of these factors and the fact that the absence of primary
employees was largely due to the picketing, was more than sufficient to
indicate that the primary employer was engaged in normal business at the
sites, in spite of the absence of the primary employees at various times.
Much the same set of facts was present in Brownfield Elec., Inc.,199
where the General Counsel contended that because the union picketed when
the primary employees were absent on four days, the picketing did not
comply with the requirement that the picketing occur at a time when the
primary employer is engaged in its normal business at the situs of the
dispute. The Board, again held that substantial compliance depended in
significant part upon the reasons for the absence of the primary employees,
and pointed out: "Picketing which is lawful primary picketing is not turned
into unlawful secondary picketing because the picketing is effective against
the primary employer and its employees. . . ." 2" The Board noted the
temporary duration of the absences, in addition to the facts that the primary
employer continued to store tools and 'materials at the situs and that work
198 Id. at 1181.
199 145 N.L.R.B. No. 113, 55 L.R.R.M. 1113 (1964).
200 Id. at 1114.
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had not been completed at the time of picketing, and concluded that the
primary employer •was engaged in normal operations during the picketing
at the situs, within the standards enunciated by Moore. Dry Dock.
These cases dealing with the absence of primary employees from a
common situs during picketing expand upon the time element discussed in
Plauche Elec 201 In the latter case, the primary employees were absent
for short periods of time during lunch and coffee breaks. In such a situation
the Board found that it would be absurd to impose such a strict requirement.
"Otherwise every common situs picket line, however otherwise observant of
Moore Dry Dock standards, would be mechanically converted from lawful
to unlawful picketing by picketing unsynchronized with lunch, coffee, or
other temporary work interruption occasioned by personal need."202 In
New Power Wire & Elec. and Brownfield, the Board carried this reasoning
beyond the "personal need" stage to cover all temporary absences from the
situs where there is no unlawful objective behind the picketing. 203 But
perhaps the most significant part of these recent cases is the listing of the
various factors considered by the Board as crucial in determining the
lawfulness of picketing at a common situs in the absence of primary
employees 2 09p
B. The "Ally Doctrine"
An important extension of the "ally doctrine" as an exception to the
secondary boycott provisions of the NLRA was enunciated in Madden v.
201 Supra note 196.
202 Id. at 255, 49 L.R.R.M. at 1449-50.
203 In this regard, Leedom, in his dissenting opinion in Brownfield, supra note
199, at 1114, stated:
To hold . . . that Brownfield was engaged in its normal business at the
picketed situs during these four days . .. comes dangerously close to holding
that the mere existence of a subcontract gives a union the unalloyed right to
picket a construction project in support of its primary dispute with the sub-
contractor at any and all times until the subcontract has been fulfilled. This I
am unwilling to do.
203a The Supreme Court recently decided a significant case dealing peripherally with
the Moore Dry Dock rules in determining whether picketing is primary or secondary.
In United Steelworkers v. NLRB (Carrier Corp.), 32 U.S.L. Week 4219 (U.S. March 23,
1964), the question presented was whether it was an 8(6)(4) violation for a union to
picket an entrance to a railroad spur track located on a railroad right-of-way adjacent
to the primary employer's premises, which entrance was used exclusively by raiload
employees. The spur track was used by the railroad to service the primary employer, as
well as several other companies located along the spur line. The Board had found the
picketing to be primary, but the Second Circuit reversed. In upholding the Board's deci-
sion, the Supreme Court agreed with the Board that Local 761, Int'l Union of Elec.
Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S: 667 (1961) was controlling. In the latter case, it was held
that picketing at a separate gate was protected primary activity where the operations
of the secondary employer were connected with the normal activities of the struck
employer. This construction of 8(b)'(4) was affirmed in the Steelworkers case: ". . . we
think Congress intended to preserve the right to picket during a strike a gate reserved
for employees of the neutral delivery men furnishing day-to-day service essential to the
employer's regular operations." 32 U.S.L. Week at 4221. The test, therefore, in separate
gate cases, is not upon .whose property the gate is located, but rather the connection
of the work of the secondary employer with the primary employer's daily operations.




Steel Fabricators, Local 810. 2" Prior to this case, a secondary employer,
who did work which would have been done by employees of the struck
primary employer, would not be protected against picketing by striking
employees of the primary employer.
In Madden, the primary employer, Ideal Roller and Mfg. Co. (Ideal),
had plants in Chicago and Long Island, New York. Teamsters Local 810,
representing employees at the Long Island plant, went on strike upon
failing to reach agreement on contract terms. Subsequently Local 810
picketed Ideal's Chicago plant, although none of the Chicago employees
went on strike or joined the picketing. A month later the Chicago plant
contracted with Silver Star Storage, Inc., operaters of commercial ware-
houses, to handle loading, unloading and shipping work previously done
by employees of the Chicago plant. Silver Star was requested by Local
810 to refuse to handle Ideal's goods and when Silver Star refused, it was
approached by Local 810 and Local 743, the Teamsters local operating in
Chicago. A second refusal was followed by picketing of Silver Star's ware-
house, with the result that on several occasions various employees of motor
carriers refused to deliver or pick up goods coming from or going to
Ideal. When an 8(b) (4) charge was filed with the Board, an injunction
was sought. The District Court for the District of Illinois denied the in-
junction on the ground that Silver Star was an ally of Ideal, in spite of
the fact that Ideal's Chicago plant was not on strike.
The court, in effect, held that a strike at the Long Island plant was
a strike against the same company in Chicago, and that therefore the picket-
ing in Chicago was lawful primary picketing. On this basis Silver Star was
doing "'struck work,' work transferred to it because the lawful picketing
of Ideal's Chicago plant resulted in Ideal's own employees being unable
to perform some of their customary duties." 205 As soon as work done by
201 222 F. Supp. 635 (D. III. 1963). The doctrine was first raised in Douds v. Metro-
politan Fed. of Architects, Local 231, 75 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.F. 1948), where Ebasco,
the primary employer, contracted work out to Project, the secondary employer, some
work being contracted for before the strike at Ebasco, but a larger amount once the
strike began. Supervisory personnel of Ebasco supervised work at Project and the
visits and working hours at Project increased after the strike. The court stated, 75
F. Supp. at 677:
The evidence is abundant that Project's employees did work, which, but for
the strike of Ebasco's employees, would have been done by Ebasco. The
economic effect upon Ebasco's employees was precisely that which would flow
from Ebasco's hiring strikebreakers to work on its own premises. The conduct
of the union in inducing Project's employees to strike is not different in kind
from its conduct in inducing Ebasco's employees to strike. . . . In encouraging
a strike at Project the union was not extending its activity to a front remote
from the immediate dispute but to one intimately and indeed inextricably
united to it.
In NLRB v. Business Machine, Local 459, 228 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
351 U.S. 962 (1956), it was held, 228 F.2d at 559, that an employer is an "ally" and
is not within the protection of § 8(b) (4)(A) when he knowingly does work
which would otherwise be done by the striking employees of the primary em-
ployer and where this work is paid for by the primary employer pursuant to
an arrangement devised and originated by him to enable him to meet his
contractual obligations.
205 Id. at 638.
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primary employees is transferred to the secondary employer because of the
picketing of the primary employer's premises, the secondary employer
becomes an "ally." The court justifies its position by the words of Senator
Taft: " 'The spirit of the Act is not intended to protect a man who ... is
cooperating with a primary employer and taking his work and doing
the work which he is unable to do because of the strike.' "206
Thus, the rule announced in the Madden case is that a secondary
employer will be considered an ally of the primary employer and engaged
in "struck work," regardless of which of the primary employer's plants is
actually struck, when it performs services or other work which had been
previously performed by employees of the primary employer, who, be-
cause of lawful primary picketing, were prevented from performing such
services or other work. This is true, even though the primary employees
of the non-struck plants have not joined the picket line, and are not
represented by the picketing union. The adoption of this rule, expanding
the "struck work" exception to a secondary boycott violation, appears to
give unions a broader opportunity to make its force felt in larger industries
which have plants and facilities in various areas throughout the country. It
of course assumes that the multi-plant employer is the common employer
and can be picketed wherever his facilities can be found. By bringing
pressure on secondary employers dealing with the common employer at
various sites, even though there is no apparent interchange or dealings
between the various plants of the common employer, the union's bargaining
power is greatly enhanced.
C. Hot Cargo
Is it unlawful under subsection 8(b)(4)(A) or (B) for a union to
picket an employer engaged in the construction industry where the union's
purpose is to secure an agreement which would require the employer to
cease doing business with other persons? The Ninth Circuit in Construction,
Prod. & Maintenance Union v. NLRB 2" recently reached a conclusion
opposite that of the Board208 on this issue. The question presented involves
application of the construction industry proviso contained in 8(e) to the
secondary boycott provisions of 8(b) (4) (A) and (B). 20°
200 Ibid.
2" 323 F.2d 422 (9th Cir. 1963), otherwise known as Colson & Stevens. Picketing
at the construction site was designed to require the employer to sign a contract which
included the following subcontractor clause: "That if the Contractors, parties hereto
shall subcontract construction work . . . the terms of said Agreement shall extend to
and bind such construction subcontract work, and provisions shall be made in such
subcontract for the observance by said subcontractor of the terms of this Agreement."
Id. at 423.
208 137 N.L.R.B. 1650, 50 L.R.R.M. 1444 (1962). The Board in Hod Carriers
Union (Swimming Pool Gunite Contractors), 144 N.L.R.B. No. 93, 54 L.R.R.M. 1165
(1963) recently adhered to its position in Colson & Stevens,, holding that a union
violated 8(b) (4) (A) by threatening to strike for the purpose of compelling a construc-
tion industry employer to sign a contract containing hot-cargo and subcontractor
clauses.
200 Subsection 8(b) (4)(A) and (B) provide that it shall be an unfair labor prac-
tice for a union to coerce (picket) where an object thereof is "(A) forcing or re-
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The Board had interpreted the construction industry proviso in 8(e)
as only sanctioning agreements voluntarily entered into and that while
such voluntary agreements would not violate 8(b) (4) (A), it would be
unlawful under that subsection for a union to take coercive measures
(picketing) to secure them. The court of appeals, on the other hand, deter-
mined that Congress intended 8(e) and 8(b) (4) (A) to be read together,
and that so reading them requires a conclusion that ". . . if such an agree-
ment may voluntarily be reached, picketing to secure it is not made
unlawful."2" The interpretation adopted by the Board was based upon the
distinction between the construction and the garment industry provisos. The
fact that the latter proviso exempts the garment industry from application
of both 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(e), while the former proviso exempts the
construction industry only from 8(e), indicated, according to the Board,
that picketing to secure a hot-cargo agreement is permissible only in the
garment industry. It was the court's opinion, however, that the distinction
between the provisos concerned picketing to enforce such agreements and
not picketing to secure the agreement itself. The court drew the following
conclusions relative to the permissibility of picketing for securing and
enforcing hot-cargo or subcontractor clauses:
(1) Picketing to secure or enforce such an agreement is per-
missible in the garment industry;
(2) Picketing to secure an agreement is permissible but not
picketing to secure enforcement thereof in the construction
industry;
(3) Picketing whether to secure or enforce an agreement is
unlawful in all other industries.
The court also disagreed with the Board on whether picketing to
secure an agreement which would require an employer in the construction
industry to cease doing business with another violated 8(b)(4)(B). The
Board had concluded that such an agreement would be tantamount to an
actual severance of the business relationship. Subsection 8(b) (4) (A) was
determined by the court lo be the only subsection dealing with picketing
to secure an agreement. If that provision did not make it unlawful, it was
not proscribed by 8(b) (4) (B).
Assuming that an agreement exists between a union and a construction
industry contractor, under either the Board or the court view, coercive
measures could not be employed to compel enforcement of the agreement.
The question arises whether the union could resort to judicial processes
quiring any employer .. . to enter into any agreement which is prohibited by section
8(e) . . . (B) forcing or requiring any person to . . . cease doing business with any
other person .. 
Subsection (e) makes it unlawful for a union to enter into an agreement which
requires an employer to cease doing business with another f hot-cargo or subcontractor
clauses]. The section contains a proviso which states: "Provided, That nothing in this
subsection (e) shall apply to an agreement between a labor organization and an em-
ployer in the construction industry relating to the contracting or subcontracting of
work to be done at the site of the construction . . . ." (Emphasis supplied.)
210 Supra note 207, at 424.
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to compel compliance or to seek other relief although self-help is unavailable.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama
recently held that judicial relief by way of injunction or damages would
coerce the contractor in deciding whether to sever relations with another,
and thus violate the purpose of 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). 211
The United States District Court, in Cuneo v. Operating Eng'rs, Local
825,212 adhered to the same interpretation of the applicability of 8(e) to
8(b) (4) as the circuit court in Colson & Stevens. It refused to enjoin work
stoppages staged for the purpose of securing a subcontractor clause from a
construction industry contractor. The court also declined to accept the
Board's interpretation of the construction industry proviso, finding that
the proviso does not proscribe coercive action to secure the employer's
agreement to a subcontractor clause.
The District of Columbia Circuit, however, drew an important dis-
tinction concerning subcontractor clauses in Orange Belt Dist. Council v.
NLRB 213 The court, finding that all such clauses are not designed to
blacklist nonunion subcontractors, refused to apply a blanket prohibition
on such clauses. The only subcontractor clauses proscribed by the Act
are those addressed to the labor relations of the subcontractor since these
are secondary as to the general contractor. Clauses addressed to the labor
relations of the general contractor, on the other hand, are considered
primary and thus not illegal.
The court enunciated the tests which it had formulated in previous
cases to determine whether a clause is "primary" or "secondary" in nature:
Will the clause "directly benefit employees" of the general contractor; 214
Are the clauses "germane to the economic integrity of the principal work
unit"; 215
 Do the clauses seek "to protect and preserve the work and
standards [the union] has bargained for"; 216
 or instead "extend beyond
the [contracting] employer and are aimed really at the union's difference
with another employer." 217
Subcontractor clauses which are designed "to limit the work to
employees who maintain labor standards commensurate with those re-
quired by the union" were declared valid by the court. The court, in a
companion case,218
 concluded, however, that a clause which limits the em-
211 Local 48, Sheet Metal Workers v. Hardy Corp., 218 F. Supp. 556 (D. Ala.
1963). Cf. Benner v. Westman, 53 L.R.R.M. 2551 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1963) where the
court indicated that injunctive relief to enforce a subcontractor clause would be
available.
212 52 L.R.R.M. 2927 (D.N.J. 1963).
213 55 L.R.R.M. 2293 (D.C. Cir. 1964). The Board had found that the union, by
making threats against a general contractor in the construction industry to enforce
a subcontractor clause, had violated 8(h) (4) (ii)(B).
214 Id. at 2296.
215 District 9, Intl Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 315 F.2d 33, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
216 Retail Clerks Union, Local 770 v. NLRB,.296 F.2d 368, 374 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
212 Local 636, United Ass'n of Journeymen v. NLRB, 278 F.2d 858, 864 (D.C.
Cir. 1960). .
218 Building & Constr. Trades Council v. NLRB, 55 L.R.R.M. 2297 (D.C. Cir.
1964). The union had threatened to picket a general contractor in the construction
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ployer's right to subcontract to those who meet the "terms of the ap-
propriate labor agreement" was unlawful. It was the court's opinion that
such a clause implicitly blacklisted all nonunion subcontractors and required
a subcontractor to agree to a full union contract, including union recognition,
on penalty of a boycott of the general contractor.
D. Consumer Picketing
The union's ability to pressure a primary employer to accede to the
demands of the union by means of consumer picketing has been put in
jeopardy by the Fifth Circuit's decision in Perfection Mattress & Spring Co.
v. NLRB 1 19 The court upheld the Board's view that consumer picketing is
a per se violation of 8(b)(4).(i) and (ii)(B ),220 on the basis that the
union's purpose in picketing the neutral employer in furtherance of the
union's dispute with the primary employer was an object clearly within
the proscription of subsection (B). Finding that the object was proscribed,
the court went on to determine whether the means used by the union were
prohibited.
Relying upon the legislative history, the court concluded that where
the object of consumer picketing "is to force the neutral to cease doing
business with another, this action is 'to threaten, coerce, or restrain ..
the neutral contrary to § (ii)." 22 ' This view was emphasized by reference
to the "publicity proviso," 222
 which specifically excluded all picketing from
the publicity exemption. Under this court's interpretation, it is unnecessary
to show that the picketing actually had a coercive effect on the neutral
employer [8(b)(4)(ii)] or on the secondary employees [8(b) (4) (i)].
The coercion is presumed from the mere existence of the pickets.
This view is in direct conflict with that of the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia in Fruit & Vegetable Packers v. NLRB.228 It was
industry because of the failure of a subcontractor to adhere to the required terms in
the contract between the union and the general contractor.
219 321 F.2d 612 (5th Cir. 1963).
220 The statute provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization:
(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any
person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage
in, a strike or refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture,
process, transport, or otherwise, handle or work on any goods . . . or to per-
form any services; or
(ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an
industry affecting commerce, where . . . an object thereof is—
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, trans-
porting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor,
or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person. .. .
221 Supra note 219, at 617.
222 The proviso states "That for the purposes of this paragraph (4) only, nothing
contained in such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity, other than
picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advising the public, including consumers . . ."
that products are being distributed by an employer with whom the union has a primary
dispute.
223 308 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1962), aff'd, — U.S. —, 32 U.S.L. Week 4350 (Apr. 20,
1964).
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there held that consumer picketing was not per se unlawful, but that there
must be a showing that the picketing was in fact coercive. In spite of the
legislative history of 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii), the court there found that the
most "plausible" interpretation of the section would be that it "outlaws
only such conduct (including picketing) as in fact threatens, coerces or
restrains secondary employers, and that the proviso is intended to exempt
from regulation 'publicity other than picketing' even though it threatens,
coerces or restrains an employer. 1224
The practical effect of Fruit Packers is that a union can engage in
consumer picketing at the premises of the secondary employer who handles
the primary employer's products, while the effect of Perfection Mattress
is to restrict a union to means other than picketing. Whether or not the
union's arsenal of economic weapons will be so reduced will be answered
by the Supreme Court.
8. UNION DISCIPLINE
In Local 283, United Auto Workers (Wisconsin Motor Corp.), 225 the
Board held that the union did not violate 8(b) (1) (A) 22° of the Act by
imposing fines on union members for refusing to abide by a union rule
in regard to production earning ceilings. The union, which had represented
the employees since 1937, had a contract containing an "agency shop"
clause.227
 During this period, the union had in effect a rule, adopted
pursuant to a by-law, which limited the amount of incentive pay that a
union member might earn over the minimum contract rate for a particular
job classification. The rate in effect at the time of the alleged violation
was set at between forty -five and fifty cents per hour over the machine rate.
When the ceiling rate had been reached for a particular day, the member
could continue working, but was required to report the excess for future
224 Id. at 315. The Fruit Packers court recognized that the Board's view could be
"squared" with the statutory language, but that the Board's interpretation was not
a "plausible" one. This was so, because the Board's construction would raise constitu-
tional questions as to the First Amendment's protection of picketing as speech. For a
full discussion of the constitutional issue as raised and discussed by both Fruit Packers
and Perfection Mattress, see Note, infra at 806.
226 145 N.L.R.B. No. 109, 55 L.R.R.M. 1085 (1964).
226 This section provides:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents—
(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 7 of this title: Provided, That this paragraph shall not
impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect
to the acquisition or retention of membership therein. . . .
Section 7 provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have
the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that
such right may be affected by an [8(a) (3)1 agreement.. .
227 The employees had the option to join the union or to reject it, in which latter
case a service fee was required. As to the recent Supreme Court decisions on the validity
of such union-security provisions, see Note, 5 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 440 (1964).
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payment, in order to comply with the rule. By reporting the excess, the
member could draw on this "bank" account when he, for some reason such
as illness, was unable to reach his normal production quota. The normal
fine for violation of the rule was one dollar, but persistent violation could
lead to a charge of conduct unbecoming a union member which would subject
the violator to a maximum fine of one hundred dollars. Although a member
could be required to pay a fine and could also be expelled from the union,
these sanctions could not be extended to impair his employment status. 228
In this case, a certain member had persistently violated the rule and
was fined accordingly. To collect these fines, the union instituted proceedings
in the state court. Thereupon, an 8(b)(1)(A) charge was filed with the
Board.
The Board narrowly construed the section, feeling so constrained by an
analysis of congressional intent and prior decisions of the Supreme Court
in Curtis Bros.229 and Bernhard Altman.23° The Board found that although
those decisions restricted employer and union conduct with respect to inter-
ference with employee rights, section 8(b) (1) (A) was limited in its objective
to violation of employee rights by the use of union organizational tactics.
Congress, in the Board's opinion, had not indicated its intent to include
within the purview of that section matters of internal union affairs 2 81
The Board pointed out that during the twelve years that followed the
Taft-Hartley amendments, 8(b) ( 1) (A) had been consistently interpreted
by the Board so as not to interfere with a union's internal matters, and
that Congress had not at any time indicated that the section should be
broadened in any way. If anything, the 1959 amendments gave support to
228 There was additional evidence that although the union rule was not in-
corporated into the collective bargaining agreement, the company had accepted the
ceilings as forming a significant element in the negotiated wage structure, and computed
wages and evaluated jobs by using the ceilings. Also, the company cooperated with
the union in administering the rule, by keeping the necessary books for members'
production reports, which books were readily available to members and union officials.
229 NLRB v. Drivers, Chauffeurs, Helpers, Local 639, 362 U.S. 274 (1960). In
this case, the Court reversed the Board's finding that a union which only represented
a majority violated 8(b) (1)(A) when it peacefully picketed an employer with the pur-
pose of compelling him to recognize the union as exclusive representative. The Court
held this was not conduct to "restrain or corece" employees in the exercise of section
7 rights. The Court further stated that the Board, under 8(b)(1)(A), was merely
given "a grant of power . . . limited to authority to proceed against union tactics in-
volving violence, intimidation, and reprisal or threats thereof—conduct involving more
than the general pressures upon persons employed by the affected employers implicit
in economic strikes." Id. at 290.
230 International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961).
The Court upheld the Board's finding of an 8(b)(1)(A) violation where the union,
not •representative of a majority, nevertheless accepted exclusive representation and
entered into a collective bargaining agreement.
231 The Supreme Court in International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S.
617 (1958); Local 100, United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices v. Borden, 373
U.S. 690 (1963); and Local 207, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental
Iron Workers Union v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701 (1963), although dealing with preemption,
indicated that matters dealing with the employment relationship are within the ex-
clusive jurisdiction of the NLRB, while questions dealing with internal union affairs
are excepted from the Board's jurisdiction.
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the Board's conclusion, since a fairly complete "code" dealing with the
internal affairs of the union was then enacted. Supervision of this subject
matter, however, was given, not to the Board, but to the courts. The Board
felt that such was a significant departure in federal labor relations policy.
In addition, the Board found that the coverage of the Landrum-
Griffin amendments was itself limited and had not attempted to venture
"to the outermost limits in regulating internal union affairs. Some subjects
still remain unregulated under existing Federal law." 232
 On the basis of all
these factors, the Board concluded that Congress could not have enacted
under Taft-Hartley, and especially under 8(b) (1 ) (A), the broad restrictions
on the power of unions to prescribe rules affecting the conduct of union
members as contended by the General Counsel in Local 283.
In upholding the particular union rule in this case, the Board rejected
the "dual status" argument of member Leedom who, in his dissent, contended
that employees who are union members have both the status of employees
and the status of union members. Those matters which affected employees
as union members were matters relating to internal union affairs, while
matters which affected employees as employees are not internal union
matters. The extent to which the matters affect the latter cannot be con-
trolled by union rules, and since the union has here attempted to control
production and wages—matters affecting not employment, but membership
in unions—it has exceeded its powers. If the majority allowed this to
control such matters in this case, contended Leedom, then,
It would appear that the Union can turn any employment matter
or Section 7 right into an internal union affair simply by adopting
a union rule or bylaw dealing with the subject and disciplining
employees thereunder.233
In rejecting this argument, the Board did not feel that the distinction
between "employee" and "union member" necessarily required Member
Leedom's conclusion. It was pointed out by the majority that unions exist
for the purpose of bargaining with respect to wages, hours and working
conditions, and that these objectives would naturally be reflected in their
constitutions and by-laws. Thus, virtually all union rules affect employment
matters. Also, the conclusion of the dissent would require the policing of a
union's decision as to the standing of its members and the rules promulgated
to determine good standing, a power not given the Board by Congress. The
Board concluded: "It is sufficient, in our view, that the Union deliberately
restricted the enforcement of its rule to an area involving the status of a
member as a member rather than as an employee. »234
The issue in Local 283 would appear destined for Supreme Court
review since it is a significant departure from the subject •matter held to
be within 8 (b) ( 1) (A) by previous Supreme Court decisions. The General
Counsel relied upon language in International Ladies' Garment Workers
(Bernhard-Altman), the Court's latest pronouncement on the section, which
232
 Supra note 225, at 1088.
233 Id. at 1091.
234
 Id. at 1088.
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it felt indicated a congressional intent to give that section a broader coverage
of union tactics than violence, reprisals and duress in organizational and
recognitional activity. The Board's approach was restricted by the precise
holdings of the previous cases exempting internal union affairs.
9. ORGANIZATIONAL AND RECOGNITIONAL PICKETING-PUBLICITY
PROVISO
The policy being evolved by the new Board under the 8(b)(7)(C) 2"
amendment to the NLRA has received strong support from two courts of
appeal. In Smitley v. NLRB,222 when Crown Cafeteria refused the union's
request that it hire through the union hiring hall and that it sign the
standard union contract, the union picketed the public entrance to the
cafeteria. The picket signs addressed "to members of organized labor and
their friends," stated that Crown employed nonunion help and asked that
Crown not be patronized. The union subsequently reduced the time of
picketing to the hours between 11 A.M. and 7 P.M., allowing the employer
to receive deliveries before the daily picketing began. This picketing oc-
curred for more than thirty days.
The old Board had held such picketing to be a violation of
8(b) (7) (C),237 its interpretation being that "Clearly . . . the intention of
the Congress to outlaw recognitional and organizational picketing is best
effectuated by confining the second proviso . . . to picketing when the sole
object is the dissemination of information divorced from a present object
of recognition." 2" In other words, the proviso would only protect picketing
that was solely for the purpose of truthfully informing the public that the
employer did not hire union workers or have a contract with the union.
The new Board, on rehearing of Crown Cafeteria,2" adopted the dis-
senting opinion of the first decision:
. . . it seems clear that Congress intended to permit a kind of
235 This section provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organi-
zation:
(7) to picket or cause to be picketed, or threaten to picket or cause to be
picketed, any employer where an object thereof is forcing or requiring an
employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization . . . or forcing
or requiring the employees of an employer to accept or select such labor
organization . . . unless such labor organization is currently certified as the
representative of such employees:
(C) where such picketing has been conducted without a petition under section
9(c) being filed within a reasonable period of time not to exceed thirty days ... :
Provided further, That nothing in this subparagraph (C) shall be construed to
prohibit any picketing or other publicity for the purpose of truthfully advising
the public (including consumers) that an employer does not employ members of,
or have a contract with, a labor organization, unless an effect of such picket-
ing is to induce any individual employed by any other person in the course
of his employment, not to pick up, deliver or transport any goods or not to
perform any services.
236 55 L.R.R.M. 2302 (9th Cir. 1964).
237 130 N.L.R.B. 570, 47 L.R.R.M. 1321 (1961).
288 Id. at 572-73, 47 L.R.R.M. at 1323.
289 135 N.L.R.B. 1183, 49 L.R.R.M. 1648 (1962).
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picketing which, but for the proviso, would have come within the
prohibition of the section. It logically follows that the intent was
to exclude from the ban picketing which, while it embraced the
proscribed object ... was nonetheless permitted because it met two
specific conditions. The first condition was . . . "of truthfully ad-
vising the public . . . that an employer does not employ members
of, or have a contract with, a labor organization." The second
condition was . . . "unless an effect of such picketing is to induce
any individual employed by any other person in the course of his
employment not to pick up, deliver or transport any goods or not to
perform any services."240
The Board, in addition, accepted the view of the court in Getreu v. Bar-
tenders and Hotel, Local 58,241
 that although the "object of picketing," as
used in 8(b) (7), may be the proscribed activity of recognitional and or-
ganizational picketing, it would be protected under subparagraph (C), if
the "purpose" of the picketing met the conditions of the proviso.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 242 in upholding the new
Board policy found that it necessarily had to reject the old Board's view,
as put forth by Crown, since to do otherwise would outlaw all recognitional
picketing beyond the reasonable time period, thereby rendering the effect
of the provisos nugatory. This would result because of the virtual impossi-
bility of finding any picketing within the terms of the proviso which did
not have as an "object" the obtaining of a contract, if not at present, at
least in the future.
In this regard, the court quoted, with approval, the recent decision
of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 242 The latter court, in addi-
tion to making the same interpretation as made by the Ninth Circuit,
pointed out what it considered to be the intended distinctions made by
Congress in the publicity proviso. First, in its use of the phrase "truthfully
advising the public," Congress did not intend to construe the proviso so
narrowly as to exclude consumers; recognizing however, that the whole
context of the proviso indicates that it should not be interpreted so broadly
as to include organized labor groups which "at a word or signal from the
picketeers, would impose economic sanctions upon the employer.... )7244
240 Supra note 237, at 575, 47 L.R.R.M. at 1324.
241 181 F. Supp. 738 (N.D.Ind. 1960).
242 Supra note 236.
2" NLRB v. Local 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 317 F.2d 193 (2d Cir. 1963).
In this case, when the employer, Picoult, refused to recognize Local 3, the union picketed
front entrances used by the public, and delivery areas located at the rear and side,
which were not frequented by the public. The picket signs initially indicated that
Picoult did not employ union workers, but subsequently, reworded signs stated that
employees of Picoult received substandard wages and working conditions. On at least
two occasions, employees of secondary employers did not cross the picket lines. The
Board held that since an election petition was not filed within a reasonable time, the
union violated 8(b)(7)(C), based on the principles of its recent decision in Crown
Cafeteria, supra note 239. The court of appeals remanded the case to the Board, ap-
parently because it was in doubt as to the new-Board's position which had just recently
been stated in Crown Cafeteria.
244 Id. at 198. As to the "signal" effect, the court stated:
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Second, Congress intended a distinction between the use of the words
"object" in paragraph (7) of 8(b), and "purpose" in subparagraph (C):
the mere fact that a union objective may be recognition or organization, does
not prohibit such picketing where the purpose is to appeal for support from
the unorganized public. Only where the purpose is to invoke pressure by
organized labor groups or individual members, is such picketing prohibited.
This latter point is the essence of the "unless" clause at the end of the
second proviso 246 The court concludes:
The permissible picketing is, therefore, that which through dis-
semination of certain allowed representations, is designed to in-
fluence members of the unorganized public, as individuals, because
the impact upon the employer by way of such individuals is weaker,
more indirect and less coercive 2 98
The application of this policy in the Smitley case resulting in the failure
of the Board to find an 8(b) (7) (C) violation was affirmed. In this case,
although the union clearly indicated that it sought recognition, its purpose
was not to seek pressure from organized, labor, but to seek aid from the
public at large. The facts that picketing occurred only at public entrances
and occurred at times which permitted the employer to get supplies and
deliveries without interruption, were strong support for this conclusion.
On remand of Local 3, however, the Board,247 was able to find a clear
violation of 8(b) (7) (C). The picket signs, even though subsequently
changed, indicated an organizational or recognitional objective. This was
especially so in light of the several demands made by the union for recogni-
tion and the failure of the union to notify the employer that recognition
was no longer sought when the picket signs were changed. In view of the
fact that pickets were posted at entrances not frequented by the public,
and the fact that at least one incident occurred where a secondary employee
was prevented from making a delivery, the "tactical purpose" was found
Under the second proviso it is the difference in purpose which determines which
is permissible picketing and which is not. In its context the second proviso
means in terms of "signal" and "publicity" picketing that while most picketing
with a "signaling" purpose is proscribed, most picketing for publicity is pro-
tected; the exceptions are that signal picketing is permissible when an object
thereof is not forcing or requiring an employer to recognize or bargain, and
publicity picketing is proscribed when it communicates more than the limited
information expressly permitted by the second proviso or when it is apparently
the purpose to advise organized labor groups or their members as shown by
signal effects, unless there is persuasive proof that those effects are inspired by
the employer who is seeking thereby to prevent legitimate second-proviso picket-
ing by the union.
Id. at 199-200.
245 Supra note 235.
246 Supra note 243, at 198.
247 144 N.L.R.B. No. 8, 53 L.R.R.M. 1508 (1963). In Barker Bros. Corp., 138
N.L.R.B. 428; 51 L.R.R.M. 1053 (1962), there were three instances when deliveries
were prevented and several instances of delay caused by 8(b)(7) picketing. The Board
held that this was not a sufficient "effect" of interference with deliveries to come within
the meaning of 8(b) (7)(C). See Comment, 4 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 661, 673 (1963).
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by the Board to be "precisely that 'signal' to organized labor which Con-
gress sought to curtail."248
From these Board and court decisions, a unanimous agreement has been
reached as to the proper handling of 8(b) (7) (C) cases. An initial deter-
mination must be made as to whether the picketing is for the object of
organization or recognition. If neither is the object, the picketing is outside
the terms of 8 (b)(7). 2" If the object is recognition or organization, and it
is determined that the picketing has continued for more than a reasonable
time, not to exceed thirty days, the picketing is unlawful, unless the con-
ditions of the provisos are met. Whether such conditions are met depends
on the immediate purpose of the picketing: whether it is an appeal to the
unorganized public or a signal to organized labor. If the former, the picketing
as in Smitley would be permitted. If found to be a "signal" as in Local 3,
it is a violation of Section 8(b) (7) (C) of the Act.
. 10. THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
The Second Circuit recently became the first court of appeals to review
the Board's newly announced theory that a union commits an unfair labor
practice if it fails to represent fairly a member-employee. 250 The Board had,
in a three to two decision, concluded in Miranda Fuel Co.,251 that section
8(b)(1)(A) "prohibits labor organizations when acting in a statutory
representative . capacity, from taking action against any employee upon
considerations or classifications which are irrelevant, invidious, or unfair." 2"
In addition, the Board had found that the union violated section 8(b) (2)
and the employer 8(a) (3) when the union, with the employer's acquiescence,
caused the employee's employment status to be derogated on the basis of an
unfair classification.
The three judges on the circuit court wrote separate opinions, with only
Judge Medina taking a position on the 8(b) (1) (A) issue. In adopting the
view of the dissenting members of the Board, Judge Medina (majority)
concluded:
...• discrimination for reasons wholly unrelated to "union member-
ship, loyalty, the acknowledgement of union authority, or the
performance of union obligations" is not sufficient to support
findings of violations of Sections 8 (a) (3), 8 (a) (2) and
8(b) (1) (A) of the Act.253
It was Judge Medina's opinion that a breach of the union's duty of
fair representation did not constitute an 8(b) (1) (A) violation since Con-
gress did not intend that duty, implicit in section 9, to be read into sections
248 Id. at 1510.
242 The fact that the picketing is outside the scope of 8(b)(7) does not preclude
a finding of another unfair labor practice. The final sentence of 8(13)(7) provides:
"Nothing in this paragraph (7) shall be construed to permit any act which would other-
wise be an unfair labor practice under this section 8(b)."
250 NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172 (1963).
251 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 51 L.R.R.M. 1584 (1962).
252 Id. at 184, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1587.
253 Supra note 250, at 175.
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7 and 8 of the Act. On the basis that the discrimination charged was not
designed to "encourage or discourage union membership," Judge Medina
also found against the Board on the 8(b) (2) and 8(a)(3) violations. 254
He concluded that:
The machinery of the Board and the remedies applied in the
enforcement of findings of unfair labor practices, as defined in the
Act, are not suited to the task of deciding general questions of
private wrongs, unrelated to union activities, suffered by employees
as a result of tortious conduct by either employees, or labor
unions.255
Chief Judge Lumbard (concurring) agreed with Judge Medina as to
the latter issue only, finding it unnecessary to take a position on the
controversial 8(b)(1) (A) question.
Judge Friendly (dissent) found that the evidence was sufficient to
establish an 8(b)(2) and an 8(a) (3) violation. He also took no position
on the breach of duty of fair representation question.
It is inevitable that the Board's position, if sustained, would leave
tremendous consequences in view of the racial problems existing in the
field of labor relations 2 06 Judge Medina realized the impact of his decision
upon the role of the NLRB when he paused to note that the Board would
be inundated with charges of racial as well as other discriminations were
the Board's theory sustained. Whether a federal fair employment practices




264 Id. at 180. Cf. NLRB v. Shear's Pharmacy, 55 L.R.R.M. 2258 (2d Cir. 1964).
The Board, on the basis of its opinion in Miranda had found that the union's arbitrary
insistence that an employee not be reinstated after an excused absence, and employer's
acquiescence violated 8(b) (2) and 8(a) (3). The court, with Judge Friendly as spokes-
man, agreed, finding that there was sufficient evidence under the view taken by the
majority in the circuit court's Miranda decision to sustain the Board's position.
255 Supra note 250, at 180.
255 J. M. Albert discusses five possible devices the Board might use in dealing with
unfair employment practices: (1) decertification of unions which discriminate; (2) the
setting aside of representation elections where an employer or a union makes "exacer-
bated" appeals to racial bias; (3) the removal of discriminatory collective bargaining
contracts as bars to representation petitions by strange unions; (4) the prevention of
a union, acting in its "statutory representative capacity, from taking action against any
employee upon considerations or classifications which are irrelevant, invidious, or un-
fair," and the prevention of employer participation in such conduct; (5) the making it
an unfair labor practice for an employer or a union to make such exacerbated appeals
to racial bias in a representation campaign as would support the setting aside of a
representation election. NLRB-FEPC2, 16 Vand. L. Rev. 547, 549, 558-93 (1963).
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